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Introduction 
American law students are borrowing large sums of money. 
For graduates at many schools, cumulative debts of $35,000 from 
college and law school have become the norm and debts of $40,000, 
$50,000 and even more are common. The sums students are 
borrowing are much larger today than they were ten years ago, 
even after adjusting for increases in the cost of living. They 
have risen at a vastly faster pace than the initial salaries at 
small law firms and government agencies. They have even risen 
at a faster pace than the initial salaries in many large firms. 
The new pattern of borrowing suggests some obvious 
questions. One is whether students' concerns about the burden of 
high debts affect the choices they are making about the kinds of 
jobs to seek upon graduation. Another is whether those who are 
borrowing these large sums are likely to have difficulty making 
payments after they graduate. As a small step toward answering 
these questions, nine law schools agreed to administer a common, 
brief questionnaire to the members of their graduating classes in 
April 1989.1 (The questionnaire is reprinted in an Appendix at 
the end.) The nine schools, though diverse in many respects, can 
not be taken as representative of all American law schools, but 
our findings can be seen as suggestive of issues almost certainly 
arising in some form at nearly all American law schools. What 
1 A tenth school participated, but because of an error of 
communication, that school administered the questionnaire only to 
those students who had debts rather than to all students in the 
graduating class. On discovering this error, we removed that 
school's data from the study. 
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follows is a report on the findings from the questionnaire. 
Our conclusions are complex. First, we have found some 
slight but significant evidence that at these nine schools, even 
after controlling for other significant factors, the higher the 
graduates' debts the more likely they are to take jobs in larger 
private law firms and the less likely they are to take jobs in 
government or legal services. Thus far, the observable 
relationship between debts and job choice is slight. It may even 
be a mirage. But it may also be a stern warning about the 
future. 
Our second major set of findings relates to the burden of 
debts on recent graduates' standard of living. our happy 
conclusion is that the great majority of the students we surveyed 
should be able to pay off their debts without serious discomfort. 
The great majority--but not everyone. A small but worrisome 
group report no job at graduation and indicate no setting in 
which they think they will find a job. Among this group, there 
are many with substantial debts, some of whom will probably have 
grave difficulty making payments. And, even among those with 
jobs at graduation, a small but significant number also seem 
likely to report difficulties. The Law School Admission Council 
(LSAC) recommends that law graduates avoid loans that will 
require them to pay out more than 10 percent of their gross 
earnings in loan payments. The LSAC sets a higher level of safe 
debt burden than others recommend. Even so, we calculate that 
about one in five or one in six of the respondents with jobs at 
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graduation (not even counting those whose jobs are as judicial 
clerks) will be exceeding the recommended LSAC maximum and that 
this group will include many of those whose earnings are least 
likely to rise swiftly after their initial year. The position of 
minority students and of students with low grades in law school 
is especially worrisome, for, by our calculations, substantially 
greater numbers of them are likely to feel strained in making 
payments. 
This study is based on the graduating class of 1989. During 
the 1990-1991 school year, as the nation has moved into a 
recession, many private firms are hiring fewer new associates 
than they did a few years ago. If the downturn in the market for 
lawyers continues, the generally optimistic tone of this report 
will become increasingly irrelevant. Many more of our students 
will be in trouble. 
I. The Nine Schools 
The nine studied schools are all well-established, long-term 
members of the Association of American Law Schools. They differ 
nonetheless in several respects that are useful for a study of 
debts and the effects of debts. Several have tuitions that are 
among the highest at American law schools. Several others have 
among the lowest.2 The schools also differ widely in the initial 
career paths of their graduates--both in the proportions of their 
graduating classes who have jobs in hand by the spring of their 
2 Three of the nine are public, six are private. 
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last year in law school and, among students with jobs, in the 
proportions who take jobs in lower-paying settings such as 
government and small firms and in higher-paying settings such as 
the large firms. 
The tuitions, expenses, and employment patterns do not vary 
randomly among the nine schools. In fact, along these 
dimensions, the nine schools divide fairly cleanly into two 
groups, which we have called Group A and Group B. Throughout 
this report we will speak primarily in terms of these two groups. 
Table I reveals some of their characteristics. The Group A 
schools have lower tuitions, have substantial numbers of students 
without jobs in hand at the end of law school, and send many or 
most of their graduates to work in government, in small private 
law firms, or in settings outside of practice. The Group B 
schools have higher tuitions and the great majority of their 
students have accepted jobs by graduation, most of them in large 
firms. Although it is not revealed by the Table, the students in 
the Group B schools generally also face higher housing and other 
living costs in the cities in which their schools are located 
than did the students at the lower-tuition group A schools. 
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Table I 
Characteristics of Nine Schools Studied, 
Divided into Two Groups, by Tuition 
Four 
Lower-Cost 
Schools 
(Group A) 
Range 
among 
schools Median 
Tuition* $2000-8000 
Percent of respondents 
with jobs in April 
of graduating yr. 39%-86% 
Percent of respondents 
expecting to 
work (after any 
judicial clerkship) 
in: 
Government, legal 
services, public 
interest 12%-31% 
Sole practice or 
small firms 
(1 to 10 lawyers) 19%-33% 
Midsized firms 
(11 to 50 lawyers) 12%-28% 
Large firms 
(50+ lawyers) 5%-21% 
$3000 
63% 
23% 
31% 
22% 
8% 
Five 
Higher-Cost 
Schools 
(Group B) 
Range 
among 
schools Median 
$9000-12,000 $11,000 
70%-96% 90% 
9%-17% 12% 
1%-18% 4% 
9%-28% 15% 
25%-66% 54% 
* For public schools, instate and out-of-state tuitions have been 
weighted to reflect the proportion of out-of-state students. All 
tuition figures have been rounded to the nearest thousand to 
prevent the reader from identifying the school. 
Our study is based on the graduates of only nine of the 175 
ADA-accredited law schools in the United States. Many schools 
not included in the study could fit comfortably into Group A or 
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Group B, but many, of course, could not. Some schools that are 
not in the study, primarily public schools in highly urbanized 
states, are like the schools in Group A in having comparatively 
low tuitions but like the schools in Group B in sending most of 
their graduates into large firms. None of these schools is in 
this study. conversely, and problematic for any study of law 
students' debts, the study includes none of the many schools--
nearly all private, many with no university affiliation--that are 
like the Group B schools in having comparatively high tuitions 
but like the Group A schools both in having a substantial number 
of graduates without jobs at the end of law school and in placing 
few of their graduates in the highest-paying settings. Thus, the 
study must be seen as a pilot inquiry into two common sorts of 
law schools, not as a representative study of American law 
schools as a whole. 
The survey was conducted in April 1989, within a month or 
so of graduation. survey forms were distributed to the entire 
graduating class at each school. The rate of response ranged 
from about 40 percent of the class at one school to over 95 
percent at another, with a median of 65 percent. In general, the 
Group A schools were smaller than the Group B schools. We thus 
obtained information on debts and career plans for 336 students 
at Group A schools and 917 students at Group B schools. 
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II. The Educational Debts of American Law Students 
Over the past two decades, undergraduate and graduate 
education has become increasingly expensive in relation to the 
average incomes of American families. The expenses of attending 
law school have risen along with the rest.3 With rising 
tuitions, law students have borrowed more to pay for their 
education. In Table II are some examples of tuitions and average 
debt burdens for fourteen law schools. The table was prepared by 
the Law School Admission Council in June 1990. Only a few of 
the fourteen schools in the table are among the nine schools in 
the study reported here. 
3 Se~ J. Kramer, Will Legal Education Remain Affordable, by 
Whom and How?, 1987 Duke L.J. 250. 
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Table II 
Tuition, Cost of Attendance and Average student Indebtedness 
at 14 Public and Private Law Schools 
Table Prepared by Law School Admission Council (1990) 
(Not the same sample of 9 schools on which this study is based) 
4 schools with 1990 
tuitions of $15,000+ 
3 schools with 1990 
tuitions of $13,000-
$15,000 
4 schools with 1990 
instate tuitions of 
$3500-5500 
3 schools with 1990 
instate tuitions 
below $2000 
* For instate residents 
Private Institutions 
1980-81 
Tuition 
- $5700 
$4800 
1990-91 
Tuition 
$15,500 
$14,100 
1990-91 
Percent Cost to 
Increase Attend 
272 $24,477 
294 $24,480 
1989-90 
Average 
Indebt-
edness 
$40,750 
$39,650 
Public Institutiorn 
$1510 $4700 311 $12,460* $23,700 
$680 $1540 226 $9066* $19,900 
Indebtednesses at the nine schools in our study show much 
the same gap between the higher and lower tuition schools.4 The 
respondents at the nine schools we surveyed were asked, "How much 
contractually enforceable debt have you accumulated from tuition 
and living expenses of college, law school, and any other 
4 Our survey was conducted in 1989. The LSAC figures come 
from 1990. 
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graduate studies?" Table III provides the overall figures for the 
nine schools. At both the Group A and Group B schools, the great 
majority of graduating students--no fewer than 70 percent at 
every school--reported at least some educational debt. Where the 
Group A and Group B schools differed was in the size of the debts 
of the students with debt. In general (and hardly surprising), 
the debts of the students at the higher-cost Group B schools were 
substantially higher than the debts of the students at the lower 
cost Group A schools. As the table reveals, the median debts of 
the students at the Group B schools were over twice as high 
($33,000) as the median debts of the students at the group B 
schools ($15,000). 
Table III 
Educational Debts from College and Law School, 
Four Lower-Tuition and Five Higher-Tuition Schools, 
Graduating Classes 1989 
Those with debt 
% of students 
with any Mean Median 
N= debt debt debt 
All respondents at: 
Group A (lower 
tuition) Schools 336 77% $21,116 $15,000 
Group B (lower-
tuition) Schools 917 81% $34,311 $33,000 
The means and medians in Table III do not, of course, 
adequately convey the diversity of debts among students. Table 
IV displays the diversity. It shows that fully a third of the 
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respondents at the five higher-cost schools had accumulated debts 
of $40,000 or more by the end of law school. Indeed, one in six 
had accumulated debts of at least $50,000. By contrast, only six 
percent of those at the lower cost schools had accumulated a debt 
of $40,000 and almost none--a scant one percent--had accumulated 
debts of $50,000. 
Table IV 
Educational Debts, by Ranges, 
at Four Lower Tuition (Group A) and 
Five Higher Tuition {Group B) Schools, 
Graduating Classes 1989 
Proportion with debts of: 
$0 
$100-$19,900 
Respondents 
at Group A 
Schools 
N= Percent 
76 23% 
113 34 
76 23 
52 15 
Respondents 
at Group B 
Schools 
N= Percent 
175 19% 
144 16 
130 14 
156 17 
$20,000-$29,900 
$30,000-$39,900 
$40,000-$49,900 14 4 20% 147 16 
$50,000 or more 5 1 165 18 
336 100% 917 100% 
10 
51% 
III. The Effects of Debts on Students' Job Choices. 
Why do students pick the jobs they do? Some reasons pertain 
to students' own preferences--for cities of certain sizes, for 
practices of certain types, for work settings that are flexible 
for families, and so forth. Others pertain to the preferences of 
employers--for graduates of certain schools, for graduates with 
high grades, for graduates thought likely to "fit in." 
To the extent that economic considerations affect student 
choices, the dominant consideration is surely not the burden of 
educational debt alone but rather the huge variations in the 
starting salaries among the work settings that law students 
enter. What every second and third year law student in America 
knows is that the salaries paid in large law firms are higher 
than the salaries paid in judicial clerkships, in government, and 
in legal services or public interest settings. They also know 
that large-firm salaries are generally higher than small-firm 
salaries. When our survey respondents were second-year students 
in 1988, the mean salary nationally for law school graduates of 
the class of 1988 who began work in firms of more than 100 
lawyers was $58,940; the mean salaries for those entering firms 
of 2 to 10 lawyers was $28,480, for those entering government, 
$26,910, and for those entering legal services or other public 
interest work, $23,860.5 One year later, the salaries reported 
by our respondents in the jobs they were actually entering reveal 
5 National Assn for Law Placement, Class of 1988 Employment 
Report and Salary Survey, at 6, 12 (G. Peschel ed. 1990). 
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essentially the same yawning gap.6 
The gap between starting salaries in the large firms and 
starting salaries in other settings has widened dramatically over 
the past 15 or 20 years. 7 (In the early l970's, for example, the 
average starting salary for an attorney at the Department of 
Justice was approximately the same as the starting salary for an 
associate in the largest Washington law firms. Today, the young 
attorney starting at the Department of Justice would earn less 
than half as much as the large firm associate.) The widening gap 
in salaries probably accounts by itself for much of the decline 
over this period that many schools report in the proportions of 
their students choosing to enter small firms, government and 
legal services.a 
6 As reported by our respondents, the mean salary for 
those entering firms of more than 100 lawyers was $62,370, while 
the mean for those entering firms of 2 to 10 lawyers was $32,830, 
for those entering governments, $29,670 and for those entering 
legal services or other public interest work, $26,030. 
7 See R. Ehrenberg, An Economic Analysis of the Market for Law 
School Students, 39 J. of Legal Ed. 627 (1989); Chambers, 
Educational Debts and the Worsening Economic Position of Small-
Firm. Government, and Legal Services Lawyers, 39 J. of Legal Ed. 
709, 721 n. 20 (1989). · 
8 See, e.g., Ehrenberg, preceding footnote. In 1974, 21 
percent of law school graduates took first jobs in "public 
interest" jobs or government (not including judicial 
clerkships). In 1988, 15 percent did so, a decline of about 30 
percent. See National Association for Law Placement, Class of 
1988 Employment Report and Salary survey at p. 4 (G. Peschel, 
ed., 1990). For another purpose, David Chambers, the author of 
this report gathered placement information from over fifty law 
schools. At over half (and at nearly all those that have been the 
principal suppliers to the large firms) , the number of students 
taking jobs in government and legal services has declined at a 
substantially faster rate than the number of available jobs in 
these settings has declined. In my survey, most of the schools 
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One question this study undertook to explore was whether 
high educational debts have intensified the effects of, the salary 
gap, creating even greater incentives or pressures for students 
to seek work in the highest-paying settings. Most of us who 
teach at schools with high tuitions hear complaints from our 
students that they cannot afford to take a public sector job 
because they need a high income to pay off their loans. Are 
debts really affecting job choices for any significant numbers of 
students? 
A. The Strategy for Measuring Effects 
In planning our survey, we reasoned that if, after taking 
other factors into account, there appeared to be DQ correlation 
between the size of students' debts and their entry into various 
higher- or lower-paying settings, that would constitute rather 
strong evidence that debts were exerting little effect on 
students' decisions to enter particular settings. 
Conversely, we reasoned that if, after taking other factors 
into account, a significant correlation persisted between debts 
and job choices, with graduates with high debts selecting jobs in 
the highest paying settings in greater numbers than graduates 
with lower debts (or with no debts), that would constitute 
evidence of a relationship of some sort between debts and 
that have been the principal suppliers of new lawyers for the 
very large firms reported that the proportion of students 
entering government or public interest work declined by over 50 
percent across the same period. 
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decisions about job settings. Sad to say (for those of us who 
want to understand), the exact nature of the relationship would 
remain ambiguous. That is, even if a positive correlation 
persisted between size of debts and the selection of high-paying 
settings, we could not be certain that debts were causing 
students to seek the higher paying settings. It would remain 
possible that, for some students, the causal link ran in the 
opposite direction: students who expected to enter a large firm 
might have been willing to incur more debt than students who 
expected to work in lesser-paying settings. In that case, high 
debts could be seen as an effect rather than a cause of plans to 
enter a large firm. It would also be possible that debts and job 
choice were related but that neither was the cause of the other: 
both the decision to incur large debts and the decision to enter 
large firms could be common manifestations of some other 
attribute--for example, a desire for living well day by day (both 
while a student and thereafter) .9 
To permit examining whether any relationship existed between 
debts and job choice, we gathered from each respondent 
information both about their total debt and about their expected 
job setting and earnings in their first year. (For judicial 
clerks, we also learned about the setting in which they expected 
9 Yet another relationship might conceivably exist between high 
debts and decisions to enter large firms: it is conceivable that 
firms prefer students with high debts believing them likely to 
work harder (in order to be certain to be able to pay them off). 
This explanation has seemed implausible because, so far as we can 
find, employers rarely ask about debts during the hiring process. 
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to work after their clerkship.) The difficult challenge we 
faced was in adequately taking into account the many other 
factors apart from debt that might affect tastes or opportunities 
for work in various settings and that once taken into account 
would eliminate any apparent effect of debt. 
We were able to gather data on a few of the many factors 
other than debts that might have affected the selection of jobs: 
Law school grades, for example, almost certainly affect 
students' opportunities. At all but one of our nine schools, we 
had self-reported information about the respondents' law school 
grades.lO Similarly, the earnings of a spouse might affect a 
student's willingness to take a lower-paying job. Race and sex 
might also affect opportunities--as well as preferences. We had 
information about sex, race, marital or partner status, and 
partners' earnings. We had no other information or clues about 
individual characteristics or preferences--no information about 
class backgrounds of the students (except that which might be 
inferred from level of debt), no information about respondents' 
other work experiences or training, and most relevantly, perhaps, 
no information about the settings for work that respondents 
aspired to enter when they started law school. 
Since ours was a study of more than one school, we also 
needed to be able to take into account the differences among the 
10 At some schools, students reported their grade point 
average; at others, their class quartile. At one, the school 
provided us information about each student's grades. At one 
other, unfortunately, no grade information was obtained. 
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schools that might affect opportunity (or that might reflect 
differences in students' career preferences). Among the many 
differences among schools that might affect the opportunities or 
reflect the tastes of their graduates, we were able to take only 
three into account: 
First, as a measure of the differences among schools in 
students' employment opportunities, we gathered from the 
placement office at each of the nine schools information about 
the total number of employers interviewing at the law school 
during the 1988-89 school year. Our hypothesis was that the total 
number of employers interviewing would be a reasonable proxy for 
the numbers of large-firm job opportunities available to the 
school's students.11 The diversity among our nine schools was 
striking. One Group A school, for example, had 54 interviewing 
employers during 1988-89; another, in Group B, had 850. We coded 
for each student the total number of employers interviewing at 
his or her school. 
Second, the opportunities of a law student are almost 
certainly affected by employers' perceptions of the general 
level of ability of the students at the student's school. As a 
crude measure of likely employer perceptions about schools, we 
coded for each student information about the median LSAT scores 
11 We could not obtain more detailed information for each 
school on the numbers of government employers or firms with over 
50 lawyers that had interviewed during the year. We are almost 
certain that there would be a very high correlation between the 
total number of interviewing employers and the total number of 
large firms interviewing. 
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and median undergraduate gradepoint averages of the entering 
classes at his or her schoo1,12 as reported by the law schools in 
the LSAS's Official Guide to Law Schools. The schools in our 
sample again varied widely--from one at which the median LSAT was 
34 to one at which the median was 43; and from one at which the 
median undergraduate gradepoint average of the entering class was 
3.0 to another at which it was 3.7. Such information about 
undergraduate grades and scores may well be an unreliable guide 
to the actual aptitudes as lawyers of a law school's students, 
but impressions based on such grades and scores may nonetheless 
affect a law school's reputation, influencing employers' 
decisions where to interview or to whom to offer jobs. 
Third, and finally, because we were trying to separate the 
effects that debts might have on students' job choices from the 
effects of the gap between salaries in various settings, we were 
interested in the how substantial the salary gap actually 
appeared to students at the various schools. We hypothesized 
that government or legal services jobs might look more attractive 
at schools where there was the least difference, for that 
school's students, between the salaries available in government 
jobs and the salaries available in private firms. As a rough 
measure of the appearance of the salary gap at each school, we 
12 For each school we created a crude index by adding 
together the median LSAT for its entering students and ten times 
the median reported undergraduate gradepoint. (Thus a school at 
which the entering class had a median LSAT of 38 and a median 
undergraduate gradepoint average of 3.3 would have an index of 
71--that is, 38 plus (10 x 3.3) = 71.) 
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created an index for each school by dividing the mean starting 
salary for our respondents at that school who took jobs in 
government, legal services or very small firms by the mean salary 
of the respondents at the school who took jobs in larger firms.13 
Here, as in each of the other measures, there were substantial 
differences among schools, due primarily to the fact that the 
mean salaries in private practice, even larger-firm private 
firms, were much lower for the graduates of schools sending few 
of their graduates into very large firms.1 4 We created a 
comparable index based on the ratio of salaries in judicial 
clerkships to salaries in private practice. We then attributed 
to each person at each school the index for his or her school. 
B. The Effects of Debts on Decisions about Jobs. 
1. Debts and Decisions to Take a Judicial Clerkship 
As an initial inquiry into the effects of debts, we examined 
whether people with high debts were shying away from judicial 
clerkships, since clerkships tend to pay less well than work in 
private practice (and nearly always pay less well than work in 
large-firm private practice). The short answer is no. 
At both the Group A schools and the Group B schools, no 
13 For this measure, a very small firm was one with 5 or 
fewer lawyers, a larger firm was one with 20 or more lawyers. 
14 The median expected salaries of students who had accepted jobs 
with private firms of 20 or more lawyers varied from $40,700 at 
one Group A school to $63,400 at one Group B school. There was 
much less difference across schools in the mean expected salaries 
of students taking jobs in government, legal services and other 
public interest work. 
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significant relationship appeared between size of debt and 
whether a person took a clerkship, before or after controls for 
other factors.15 Persons with very high debts were as likely to 
take clerkships as persons with low debts. Within the 
information available to us, the only factor consistently related 
to obtaining a clerkship was law school grades--the higher the 
grades, the more likely a clerkship--and even this relationship 
was not particularly strong.16 Thus, to the extent that grades 
create opportunities for clerkships, students appear to seize the 
opportunities without regard to the burden of their debts during 
the clerkship year. 
Some persons might expect that debts would exercise the 
reverse effect on decisions to clerk--that canny, debt-encumbered 
students might seek clerkships because they could open doors 
thereafter to the highest paying jobs.17 Within our data, 
15 Nor were those with very high debts at either sort of school 
less likely to take clerkships. Similarly, no significant 
correlation appears between debt level and decisions to take a 
clerkship when those without debts are excluded from the analysis. 
16 At the Group A schools, the correlation between grade 
quartile and taking a job as a clerk was -.19 (remember: the 
higher the quartile the lower the gradepoint). At the Group B 
schools, the correlation was -.20. At the Group A schools, but 
not the group B, women were more likely to take clerkships than 
men. At neither the Group A nor Group B schools was taking a 
clerkship significantly correlated with debt. (At both the Group 
A schools and the Group B schools, the correlation between debt 
size and taking a large firm job was -.04.) 
17 From conversations with some persons who read this report 
in draft, students at many schools appear to believe that working 
for state court judges does not improve their chances for 
obtaining jobs with firms or other employers. We did not learn 
what sort of judge the repondents expected to work for. 
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however, after controlling for grades, no evidence exists for 
the reverse effect either. It is nonetheless possible that two 
conflicting trends are cancelling each other out--that some high-
debt students are avoiding clerkships and other high-debt 
students, with a longer view, are deliberately seeking them out. 
That is possible, but on the data we have, the more parsimonious 
explanation is simply that debts are not exerting much influence 
one way or the other on decisions to clerk. 
2. Debts and Decisions to Take Jobs in Other Settings 
Unlike judicial clerkships, most other jobs that law 
students take after graduation last more than one year. We thus 
expected that, in general, the salaries known to be available in 
settings such as large firms or prosecutor's offices would exert 
more of an effect on decisions about jobs than the salaries in 
judicial clerkships. We also expected that debts would exert 
more of an influence on decisions to seek positions in these 
longer-term settings. Table V reveals, before taking into 
account the effects of other variables, the relation between 
debts and entry into various job settings for the graduates of 
the Group A and Group B schools. 
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Proportion 
expecting to 
take jobs in: 
Lower Paying 
Settings* 
Mid-paying 
Settings** 
Firms of 20+ 
lawyers 
Table V 
Proportions of Responding Students Taking Jobs in 
Lower Paying Settings, Midpaying Settings, 
and in Firms of More than 20 Lawyers, 
by Size of Educational Debts 
Students with 
debts of debts of debts of debts of 
$1000- $15,000- $30,000- $40,000-
no debts $14,900 $29,900 $39,900 $49,900 
(n=242) (n=174) (n=261) (n=200) (n=154) 
24% 39% 31% 25% 18% 
24 24 18 14 21 
~ _ll _2.1 _§2. _.§_1 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
debts of 
$50,000 
or more 
(n=165) 
17% 
15 
~ 
100% 
* Lower paying settings include government, legal services, public defenders 
public interest work, and firms of 5 or fewer lawyers. The mean earnings of 
respondents who had taken jobs in these settings was $29,300. 
** Midpaying settings include firms of 6-19 lawyers, corporate counsel's 
offices, nonpractice jobs in business, and others not categorized. The mean 
earnings of respondents who had taken jobs in these settings was $37,600. 
*** The mean earnings of respondents taking jobs in firms of 20 or more 
lawyers was $55,200. 
Before controlling for any other factors, if those without 
debts are included in the analysis, then no consistent, linear 
relationship is apparent between debts and jobs settings. If, 
however, those without debts are excluded (on the plausible 
theory that the no-debt students may come from higher-status 
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families and thus have class-tied reasons for leaning toward 
high-status settings) , then there is a consistent relationship 
between debt and job setting: the higher the debts, the smaller 
the proportion of students taking jobs in government, legal 
services or small firms and the larger the proportion of students 
taking jobs in mid-sized and large firms. High debts do seem to 
accompany decisions to enter the higher-paying settings. 
But appearances, of course, are frequently deceiving and a 
moment's reflection will reveal a strong reason for suspecting 
that Table V is deceptive: one would expect the high-debt 
students to include a higher proportion of students entering 
larger firm practice not because of high debts themselves but 
because high debts reflect high tuitions and, within our sample, 
the high-tuition schools are sending very large numbers of their 
graduates into large-firm private practice for reasons that may 
or may not have anything to do with debts. 
Table V does not take into account any of the other factors 
that might affect job choices. When we do so, within the data 
available to us, the relationship of level of debt to career 
choice is more complex but still fairly consistent and still in 
the same direction. We performed a series of regressions,18 in 
which our dependent variables--the phenomenon we were trying to 
understand--were (1) whether or not the respondent expected a 
job in government, legal services, or a small firm (the three 
18 Regression analysis is a form of statistical analysis 
that permits simultaneously measuring the relation between 
several factors and some other phenomenon one wants to explain. 
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generally lower-paying settings) and (2) whether or not the 
respondent expected a job with a firm of twenty or more lawyers. 
(We selected twenty lawyers as the dependent variable because 
sufficient numbers of the Group A school graduates took jobs in 
such firms to use this as a dependent variable for separate 
analyses of the Group A and Group B schools.)l9 For persons who 
were going to work next year as judicial clerks, we used their 
expected work setting after the clerkship. Because our dependent 
variables were dichotomous (1/0),2° we performed the regressions 
in both unaltered and logit form. We obtained closely similar 
results in each form and report here on the results from the 
unaltered form.21 
As factors that might explain job choice (the control 
variables), we used the students' debt in dollars, whether the 
19 Within the group B schools, we also used as a dependent 
variable whether or not the student entered a firm of over 50 
lawyers. our analyses produced nearly indistinguishable results. 
20 We also did some regression analysis using expected first 
year income as the dependent variable. Our findings were close 
to the same as those reported for our dichotomous variables of 
job setting, but since large numbers of the Group A graduates had 
no job and thus did not know what their income would be, we could 
include many more persons in the analysis by using as our 
dependent variable the expected setting of work. Most of those 
without jobs seemed realistic about their opportunities. As we 
report below, many more of those without jobs expected jobs in 
low-paying settings than of those with jobs. 
21 The coefficient of the constant term in a logit 
regression cannot be directly interpreted as a change in 
probability. For this reason, when results by the two approaches 
are closely similar, they are more easily interpreted if reported 
in unaltered form. 
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student had debts above various levels,22 the quartile of the 
student by grades within his or her class, whether the student 
had a working spouse or partner, and the student's race and sex. 
As reported above, we also attributed to all respondents three 
items of information about the particular school they attended: 
the numbers of employers interviewing at the student's school in 
1988-89; an index based on the median LSAT and undergraduate 
gradepoint of the school's entering class; and the ratio of the 
mean starting salary in government, legal services, or very small 
firms of that school's graduates and the mean at that school of 
those entering larger firms (the salary-gap ratio). We performed 
regressions for all nine schools together, for the Group A 
schools and the Group B schools and for each individual school. 
Our most pertinent finding is that, even after controls, 
educational debt does seem related to job choice, although mildly 
and weakly, much more weakly than some other factors. What we 
find is that, in general, when all students in our sample are 
examined together or the Group A students and the Group B 
students are examined as separate groups, the higher the 
student's debts the greater the probability of the student taking 
a larger-firm job.23 The results of the regressions are displayed 
22 As measures of debt, we used as controls debts in dollars 
as well as debts above various levels, such as debts over and 
under $30,000 and $40,000 (in the belief that debts may exert 
little influence until they reach a certain level). 
23 In the regressions we performed, debts in dollars almost 
always proved more significantly related to job setting choice 
than debts above various levels. Thus, in the analyses reported 
here, we have used debts in dollars as the sole measure of debt 
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in Appendix Tables Al, A2, and A3.24 In the analyses of the nine 
schools as a group, the relationship between size of debt and 
entering a large firm is statistically significant (p<.02) both 
when all students are considered together and when students 
without debts are considered separately. When the Group A and 
Group B students are considered separately, the size of debt is 
significant only when the analysis is limited to those who have 
debts (p<.OS). 
Nonetheless, even though significant, the apparent 
relationship between debt and job choice is slight. 
Specifically, when looking at all respondents with debts, the 
data suggests that for each $10,000 increase in a student's debt, 
there is a roughly 3 percent decrease in the probability that the 
student will take a job in government, legal services or a small 
firm and a 3 percent increase in the probability that he or she 
will take a job in a larger firm. 
When we look separately school by school, our findings 
become murkier. In almost every analysis, the relationship 
between debt and job choice is in the expected direction--more 
debt, greater likelihood of a larger firm job--but at only three 
of the eight schools25 was the relation of debts to job setting 
to avoid problems of colinearity. 
24 see the third and fourth columns in each Table. 
25 At one of our nine schools, we had no information about 
grades. Since, as explained below, grades turned out to be such 
a critical factor, we did not include this school in the 
regressions. 
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statistically significant (at the .os level). 
If, as our analysis suggests, the size of students' debts 
is related, but only mildly related, to choice of job setting, 
what other factors are more strongly related? This is a study of 
the effects of debt on job choice, not a study of all the factors 
affecting job choice in general. Nonetheless, because further 
research is needed to isolate the effects, if any, of debt, some 
discussion seems desirable to explain the factors that seem more 
important than debts. They are factors that will be especially 
important to control for in any future examination of the impact 
of debt and one of them, the most important among the other 
factors, helps shed more light on the possible impact of debt. 
We had, as listed above, only five pieces of information 
about our individual respondents other than the information about 
educational debt: sex, race, marital/partner status, earnings of 
spouse or partner, and law school grades. For each of these, a 
plausible hypothesis could be advanced for a relationship with 
the settings of work that the respondents entered. Of these 
five, however, by far the most significantly related (and 
generally, in our analyses, the only one significantly related) 
to students' selection of job setting was the student's rank by 
quartile within his or her class. See Appendix Tables Al, A2, and 
A3. Thus, our second major finding: In general. the higher the 
student's grades while in law school. the greater the 
probability that the student had taken a job or expected to take 
a job in a larger law firm and the lower the probability that the 
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student expected a job in government, legal services, or a small 
firm. 
At many of the schools within our sample, particularly among 
the schools in Group A, the relationship between grades and job 
setting was powerful, even stunning. At one Group A school, for 
example, 55 percent of the class members who reported themselves 
in the top quarter of their class had taken a job or expected to 
take a job after any judicial clerkship in a mid-sized or large 
firm, while zero percent--not one person-- reporting themselves 
in the bottom two quarters expected to work in such a firm. At 
another Group A school, 92 percent of those in the top quarter, 
but only 16 percent of those in the bottom two quarters expected 
to work in a midsized or large firm. At some of the Group B, 
high-tuition schools there was also a strong relation between 
grades and entry into the large firms.26. 
The strong correlation between high grades and entering 
large firms is hardly a mystery. Every law-school placement 
director acknowledges the substantial weight that many employers 
accord to grades in the hiring process. Students with high grades 
have more choices--and when given the opportunity, they commonly 
choose larger firms over smaller firms, government and public 
26 At one Group B school, 70 percent of those in the top 
quarter but only 8 percent of those in the bottom two quartiles 
expected to work in a firm of more than 50 lawyers. Not all Group 
B schools exhibited such a relationship. At two of the Group B 
schools, the proportion entering large firms was closely similar 
across the top three quartiles and fell off only in the fourth 
quartile. At another, there was no significant difference across 
the quartiles at all. 
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interest work. Exactly why persons with the highest grades prefer 
the larger firms is less certain. That they do is, of course, 
completely consistent with the hypothesis that debts are 
important to their choice. But, of course, that students with 
high grades pick the large firms is also consistent with several 
other explanations: the higher earnings that are available in the 
large ~irms are attractive in themselves without regard to debt 
and large firms may be perceived by students as more prestigious, 
and more advantageous for mobility, for training, and for 
intellectual challenge.27 
The significant place of law school grades in job selection 
may shed light on the place of debts in job selection: If high 
grades can be seen as signifying choice and control over job 
opportunities, then one might expect, within our data, that, to 
the extent that debts are playing a role in career choices, they 
would display their effects more in the decisions of students 
with higher-grades--display themselves more, that is, in the 
decisions of the students who are free to pick between larger 
firms and other settings than in the decisions of the students 
with less control. And there is, in fact, support for this 
proposition in our data, which leads to a third finding: 
Considering students at all schools together and controlling for 
the other factors we have been discussing. high debts are 
significantly related to job choice among students in the top 
quarter of the class. are still related but less strongly to job 
27 See R. Stover, Making It or Breaking It (1988). 
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choice among students in the next quarter, but are not 
significantly related to job choice among students in the lower 
half of the class.28 
After taking grades and debt into account, none of the other 
individual data we gathered bore a significant relationship to 
job setting in our analysis of the Group A schools or Group B 
schools as groups. When we analyzed each school individually, 
there were two schools at which women were significantly more 
likely than men to take jobs in government, legal services, or 
small firms and one school at which African-Americans and 
Hispanic students were significantly less likely than white 
students to take jobs in a larger firm, but no such pattern for 
either women or minorities appeared at any of the other schools. 
When we shift from individual information that may affect 
opportunity or choice to school information that may affect 
opportunity or choice, each of the pieces of information about 
the schools as a whole--numbers of interviewing employers, 
28 For example, among students in the top quartile of the 
class, there was a 4 percent increase in the probability of 
taking a job in a large or mid-sized firm for every $10,000 
increase in debt, after taking other factors in Appendix Table A 
into account (t-ratio for debt: 2.9; p<.Ol). But, there was no 
significant relationship between debt and taking a job in a large 
or midsized firm among students in the bottom two quarters of the 
class. Within both the students with high grades and the students 
with lower grades, essentially the same pattern held whether the 
analysis was limited to students with at least some debt or 
included all students with and without debt. Even with the 
students in the top quarter of the class, however, only a small 
part of the variance is being explained by debt (considering all 
students in the top quarter with and without debt, the marginal 
r2 for debt in dollars is .022, after other significant factors 
are taken into account) . 
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median LSAT and undergraduate GPA for the class, and ratio of 
earnings in large firms and other settings--correlates strongly 
with the other information about schools as a whole, with whether 
students took jobs in larger firms and with whether students took 
jobs in government, public interest work and small firms. In 
general, taking jobs in large firms correlates with higher 
numbers of interviewers at the school, higher mean LSAT and 
gradepoints for the school's entering class, and a greater spread 
between the salaries of those at the school taking jobs in 
government and the salaries of those taking jobs in larger firms. 
Conversely, the reverse relation appeared between these whole-
school variables and taking jobs in government, public interest 
or small firms. 
In regression analyses in which we analyzed all Group A 
schools or all Group B schools or all nine schools together, the 
variable among these all school variables that most strongly 
correlated with job-setting choice was the number of employers 
who had interviewed at the school in the 1988-89 school year. 
Thus a fourth finding: The larger the number of interviewers at 
a school, the greater the likelihood of a student taking a job in 
a large firm, and the smaller the likelihood of taking a job in 
government, legal services, or public interest work. At the 
school where there were 54 interviewers, for example, only 16 
percent of the respondents expected to work in a firm with 
twenty or more lawyers and only 5 percent expected to work in a 
large firm with more than fifty lawyers. By contrast, at the 
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school where there were 850 interviewers, 74 percent of the 
students expected to work in a firm of twenty or more lawyers and 
61 percent of the students expected work in a firm with more than 
fifty lawyers. 
Within our data, once the number of interviewers was 
controlled for, none of the other whole-school variables explains 
much additional variance. One small exception is that, when 
considering all schools as a group, the salary-gap ratio--the 
measure at each school of the gap between mean earnings in bigger 
firms and the mean earnings in government, legal services and 
small firms--does serve slightly to predict students' job 
selection: the narrower the salary gap at a student's school, 
the higher the probability of the student's taking a job in one 
of the lower-earning settings.29 
We must nonetheless exercise great caution in identifying 
any one or two particular qualities of law schools that are 
critically important in affecting job decisions or opportunities. 
We have only nine schools in our sample. For purposes of 
identifying school-related variables of significance, we have in 
an important sense not a sample of over 1000 but a sample of only 
nine. We would have to have data from many more schools before 
we could speak with any confidence about the qualities of schools 
that seem to affect the job settings chosen by (or available to) 
29 See Appendix Table A1, columns 1 and 2. For neither the 
Group A schools nor the Group B schools taken separately does the 
salary gap ratio help explain entry into the lower-paying 
settings. At the Group A schools, but not the group B, the salary 
gap is mildly related to entry into the higher-paying settings. 
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their graduates. And, of course, even if it turned out that the 
numbers of interviewing employers was a critical predictor, we 
would still need to explain why some schools attract so many 
more interviewers than others. There is, within our small sample 
of schools, a strong correlation between numbers of employer 
interviewers at each school and the index we developed for each 
school based on the entering class's median LSATs and 
undergraduate gradepoint average,30 but whether number of 
interviewers is simply a surrogate for employers' beliefs about 
the quality of the students we cannot tell on the limited 
information available to us. 
3. Summary of Findings on the Effects of Debts on Job 
Choice 
The study of nine schools suggests a relationship between 
debts and job choices and suggests that debts may be exerting 
some influence on job choices, but that, if they are doing so, 
the influence is mild: as debts increase, only a slight decrease 
occurs in the proportion of students expecting to enter 
government, legal services, or public interest work, and only a 
slight increase occurs in the proportion expecting to enter 
larger firms. 
Are we seeing the beginnings of a trend, a trend that could 
make the effects of debt more and more pronounced over time as 
tuitions and other law school expenses continue their rapid rise 
30 The correlation is .88. 
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and as the gap between large-firm salaries and other salaries 
continues to widen? It is possible, in fact, that we have 
underestimated the effects of debt even today.31 Or is the small 
apparent effect of debts on individual decisions an illusion? 
The apparent impact of debt is slight enough that it remains 
possible that some other factors we are not yet able to measure 
will account for the small relationship between debt and job 
choice. To the extent that economic factors shape job choice, it 
may be that the effects of the salary gap among settings is so 
overwhelming that, even if everyone's educational debts were 
31 Here is one way that we may be underestimating the 
relationship between debt and job choice. It seems likely that if 
debt has a relationship to job choice, the relationship will not 
be the same for everyone. Some students, but far from all, will 
be affected by debt in making choices about jobs or will expect 
to take high-paying jobs and are thus more willing to borrow; but 
many others with high debts wanted to work in large firms for 
reasons that have nothing to do with their debts and do not fix 
the amount they are willing to borrow with an eye to the 
earnings in the large firms. If this is so (and if, as appears 
from the analysis reported above, debt is nonetheless related to 
job choice for the sample we have as a whole), then debt must 
have a stronger relationship to job choice for the members of the 
subgroup who are susceptible to being affected than appears 
above. Consider a hypothetical example. Appendix Table A1 reveals 
that when all respondents in our study with any debt are analyzed 
together, there is a 3 percent increase in the probability that a 
student will take a job in a large firm for each $10,000 increase 
in that student's debt. If, however, debt and job choice are 
linked for only a fourth of the sample, then, for each additional 
$10,000 in debt, we would have to have a 12 percent increase 
(four times 3 percent) in the probability that a person in the 
linked group would take a large firm job in order to average out 
to a 3 percent increase overall, at least if we assume that the 
effects of other factors (such as grades) are the same for the 
susceptible group as for the others. Unfortunately, within our 
data, we can neither determine the direction of the relationship 
between debt and job choice nor determine the size of the group 
for whom there is a relationship. 
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completely forgiven at the end of law school, almost everyone 
would make the same job choices that they do today. 
At the same time, even if individual debts were eventually 
proven to bear no relation to job decisions, it does not follow 
that the rising costs of legal education are having no effect on 
the changing patterns of students' choices. It is possible that 
high tuitions contribute, now more than in the past, to a sense 
that a law degree is a capital asset acquired at a very high 
cost, an asset that deserves to be exploited for all possible 
financial return. such a state of mind, if it exists, might be as 
pervasive among those with no debts as it is among those with 
high debts. If so, then even if individual debt exerts little 
effect on individual choice, the costs of legal education may 
still be exercising a powerful, indirect influence on the numbers 
of students willing to consider work in lower-paying settings. 
IV. Will These Students Have Difficulties Paying Off Their Loans? 
The surveyed students reported their accumulated educational 
debts, and many of them, noted already, have accumulated a 
substantial amount. They also reported their expected job 
settings and, if known, their expected first-year earnings. From 
this information, we can make some rough assessment of the 
difficulties, if any, that they are likely to experience in the 
year after law school in paying their loans. 
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A. Measuring the Burden: How Much Debt Can Law Graduates Manage? 
Most educational loans, when assumed, are for ten- to 
fifteen-year terms, with interest rates that vary from eight to 
as high as twelve percent. Most law students are eligible to 
borrow up to $7500 per year of government-guaranteed Stafford 
Loans at 8 to 10 percent interest, but additional loans, for 
example, the Supplemental Loans for Students (SLS) loans, bear a 
higher rate. The size of payments a borrower will make month by 
month over the term of a loan depends, of course, not only on the 
rate of interest and the amount borrowed but also on the number 
of years over which the loan is to be paid, as well as on whether 
the borrower participates in a graduated payment program under 
which payments are lower in the first years after graduation. 
Table VI provides some illustrations of annual and monthly 
payments for loans of varying amounts. All the examples assume 
an interest rate of 9 percent, the rate available to students 
with government-guaranteed loans who consolidate their payments. 
(Only government-guaranteed loans are eligible for consolidation 
under current programs.) What varies is whether the loan is paid 
over a 10-year or a 20-year term and whether the borrower elects 
an interest-only payment plan for the first two years. 
35 
Table VI 
Payments of Interest and Principal 
Due in First Year after Law School on Loans 
of Varying Amounts, Assuming 9 Percent Interest 
and Varying Terms 
Annual (and Monthly) Payments 
Due under Payment Plan with: 
No principal payments 
during first two years* 
Principal and interest 
payable over 20 years* 
Principal and interest 
payable over 10 years* 
Loans 
totaling 
$25,000 
$2250/yr. 
( $188/mo.) 
$2700/yr. 
($225/mo.) 
$3800/yr. 
($317/mo.) 
Loans 
totaling 
$40,000 
$3600/yr. 
($300/mo.) 
$4320/yr. 
( $360/mo.) 
$6080/yr. 
($507/mo.) 
Loans 
totaling 
$60,000 
$5400/yr. 
( $450/mo.) 
$6480/yr. 
($540/mo.) 
$9120/yr. 
( $760/mo.) 
* Terms available through both LAWLOANS Program of HEMAR Ins. 
Corp. and the Law Access Program of the Law School Admission 
Council. 
Can recent graduates afford to make annual payments of $2250 
or $4320 or $9120 toward their loans and still "manage"? The 
answer, of course, depends on their income, the other demands on 
that income and on what we mean by "manage." At one extreme, 
managing can mean being able to pay off a loan while avoiding 
bankruptcy. Most writers about educational debt sensibly reject 
such a narrow view. They appear to ask how much a person can 
pay without feeling very pinched. In many respects, they seem to 
be asking a question about psychological burdens not about 
serious financial privation. 
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At least two different methods have been used to assess the 
difficulties that law students (and other students) might have in 
making payments. The first--and the one most commonly used by 
those who write about educational debt--is to calculate the debt 
payments as a proportion of earned income, dividing the total 
payment due each year by either pre-tax or post-tax annual 
earnings. These writers then recommend limiting borrowing so 
that no more than a certain proportion of income will be consumed 
by loan payments. The second manner ignores percentages. It 
begins with the student's probable annual earnings, subtracts 
from them an estimate of income taxes and Social Security taxes 
as well as the annual payments on the loan and then simply looks 
to see how much disposable income is left over to live on. How 
much disposable income is enough can then be judged by any of 
many living-standard formulas that are available. 
These different approaches can produce dramatically 
different outcomes: A young professional with a high income can 
make debt payments that constitute a quite substantial proportion 
of his or her income but still have plenty left over for living 
expenses. Because the literature includes both approaches and 
because we are interested in both the real and the psychological 
impact of debts, we discuss both ways of calculating impact. 
We begin with payments as a proportion of income. Table 
VII provides an illustration of a persons with educational debts 
of $30,000 and $40,000 and incomes of varying levels and shows 
the proportions of their gross incomes that would be taken up in 
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paying off their loans under the same three plans we just 
examined in Table VI. 
Table VII 
Illustration of Person with Loans of $30,000 and $40,000 
at 9 percent interest: 
Proportion of Gross Annual Income That Will Be Paid Out, 
Assuming Incomes of Varying Amounts 
and Varying Terms 
Assuming loans of $30,000, 
loan payments as a 
proportion of gross income 
under payment plan with: 
No Principal Payments 
during first two years 
Principal and Interest 
payable over 20 years 
Principal and Interest 
payable over 10 years 
Assuming loans of $40,000, 
loan payments as a 
proportion of gross income 
under payment plan with: 
No principal payments 
during first two years 
Principal and interest 
payable over 20 years 
Principal and interest 
payable over 10 years 
Percent of income paid out 
Gross Gross Gross Gross 
Income Income Income Income 
$25,000 $30,000 $40,000 $60,000 
10.8% 9.0% 6.8% 4.5% 
13.0% 10.8% 8.1% 5.4% 
18.2% 15.2% 11.4% 7.6% 
14.4% 12.0% 9.0% 6.0% 
17.3% 14.4% 10.8% 7.2% 
24.3% 20.2% 15.2% 10.1% 
As illustrated in Table VII, a person with gross income of 
$40,000 and a debt of $30,000 would expend between 6.8 percent 
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and 11.4 percent of her income toward her loans, depending on the 
terms of the loan. Much has been written in recent years about 
the size of the educational debts that borrowers can comfortably 
handle in relation to their income.32 The percentages of after-
tax income that writers believe that people can manage as 
educational loan payments vary widely,33 but nearly all recommend 
that borrowers keep themselves to fairly low rates of payment in 
relation to their income. 
Daniere, one of the respected writers in the field, advised 
students not to assume educational debts greater than 7.5 percent 
of post-tax first-year income--or roughly 5 to 5.5 percent of 
gross or pretax earnings.34 Horch, another frequent and well-
regarded writer, suggests different percentages ~c;r people at 
different earning levels (somewhat higher percentages as income 
rises) . For professionals beginning work at higher beginning 
salary levels, he views 9 percent of after-tax earnings (or 
roughly 6 to 7 percent of gross earnings) as a manageable 
32 See review by Stedman, The Cumulative Educational Debt of 
Postsecondary Students: Amounts and Measures of Manageability, 
Congressional Research Service (mimeo) (1984); J. Hansen, 
Student Loans: Are They overburdening a Generation? (Washington 
Office of the College Board) (1987). 
33 See Hansen, supra, at 16; see also Horch, Determining Student 
Capacity to Borrow, in Proceedings of College Scholarship 
Service Colloquium on student Loan Counseling and Debt Management 
77, 78 (1985). 
34 Id. at 78. 
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level.35 John Kramer in a 1987 article says that "no borrower 
can afford to repay educational debt in excess of • 8 percent 
of posttax income" (or roughly 5 to 6 percent of gross 
earnings) .3 6 Look at Table VII again. For those who have 
borrowed $40,000, only persons earning considerably more than 
$40,000, probably close to $60,000, would stay within what these 
commentators regard as a safe range and even then only if they 
were eligible for the federal loan consolidation program that let 
them make no principal payments in the first few years, with 
substantially higher payments later. Those who have borrowed 
$30,000 would have to earn at least $40,000 to stay within the 
comfortable range. 
The Law School Admission Council, in its literature 
explaining the Law Access Program for consolidating debts, takes 
a more expansive approach. It assumes that law graduates can 
afford to make payments representing a significantly higher 
proportion of their incomes than the other writers recommend.37 
The LSAC recommends to law students "monthly loan payments 
totaling no more than 10 percent of your gross starting 
salary.n38 For law students, ten percent of gross salary will 
35 See Horch, Estimating Manageable Educational Loan Limits 
for Graduate and Professional Students (Educational Testing 
Service 1978). 
36 Will Legal Education Remain Affordable, by Whom, and 
How?, 1987 Duke L.J. 250, 263-64. 
37 LSAC, Law Access: Managing Your Law School Debt (August 1989)· 
38 Id. at 2. 
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represent about 14 or 15 percent of post-tax earnings, almost 
twice as high a limit as that recommended by Horch or Daniere.39 
Under the view of LSAC, the person borrowing $40,000 could feel 
comfortable making payments on an income of somewhat less than 
$40,000 (around $36,000 in fact), as opposed to the income of 
$55,000 to $65,000 that the other writers would commend. 
When we turn to the second way of measuring the effects of 
debts--not in terms of a proportion of earnings but simply in 
terms of what is left over after taxes and debt payments--the 
burden of debt seems rather different. In a 1989 article, Kramer 
has rethought the position he took in 1987, and argues, cogently, 
that, for these young professionals, what ought to concern us 
most is not the percentage of income that loan payments represent 
but rather the disposable income still available after the 
payments.40 Using the same income figures used in Table VII, 
Table VIII makes estimates of taxes and calculates disposable 
income after taxes and after loan payments for persons borrowing 
$40,000 on the most advantageous plan for repayment that defers 
principal payments until after the first two years. 
39 The Lawloans Program of HEMAR Insurance, which has loaned 
more than $400 million to law students, makes no recommendation 
of a percentage of income beyond which students should not burden 
themselves. In presentations to groups, Kevin Moehn, Vice 
President of HEMAR, suggests not assuming loans that will entail 
payments that exceed 8 percent of gross income. Conversation with 
author, November 29, 1990. His recommendation is thus midway 
between the position of writers like Horch and Daniere and that 
of Law Access. 
40 See Kramer, Who Will Pay the Piper or Leave the Check on 
the Table for the Other Guy, 39 J. of Legal Ed. 655, 670-87 
(1989). 
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Table VIII 
Illustration of Disposable Income after Taxes and after 
Loan Payments for Persons with Varying Levels of 
Income Who Have Borrowed $40,000 
Disposable income 
Estimated after taxes and 
Assumed annual adjusted income loan payment on 
gross earnings after all taxes* a $40,000 loan** 
$25,000 $19,250 $15,650 
$30,000 $22,500 $18,900 
$40,000 $28,400 $24,800 
$60,000 $41,400 $37,800 
* Taking into account federal income taxes for a single person, 
Social Security taxes, and an estimate of state and municipal 
taxes. See Kramer, Who Will Pay the Piper or Leave the Check on 
the Table for the Other Guy, 39 Journal of Legal Education 655, 
673-77 (1989). 
** Assuming that person chooses payment plan under which all 
loans are consolidated at 9 percent with no principal payments 
due during first 2 or 4 years. In first year, on a loan of 
$40,000, $3600 in interest would be due. 
In Table VII, we saw that a person earning $40,000 with a 
debt of $40,000 would expend 9 percent of pretax earnings or 
nearly 13 percent of after-tax earnings in annual loan payments, 
assuming the lowest payment plan available--enough to make 
Daniere and Horch nervous and just inside the outer limits 
suggested by the LSAC. As Table VIII reveals, however, the 
person earning $40,000 would still have $24,800 left over in 
disposable income after making all payments on taxes and loans. 
On $24,800, a young lawyer could pay $600 a month in rent, $400 a 
month in car payments and auto insurance, $500 a month for food 
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(including restaurant meals) and still have almost $600 per month 
left over for other expenses. Of course, this young lawyer would 
prefer to hold onto the $300 per month that she is having to pay 
toward her loans, but even with the payments she can lead a life 
that most single Americans would envy. Even if she did not opt 
for a plan that deferred the principal payments, but simply 
consolidated the loan and paid it over a 20-year term at $360 per 
month, she would still have about $24,000 in disposable income. 
On this analysis, and at these levels of earnings, the more 
generous loan limits suggested by the LSAC seem fully justified. 
Under even the LSAC's approach, however, the position of 
those with debts of $40,000 and smaller gross earnings, earnings 
not of $40,000 but rather of $30,000 or $25,000, is less 
enviable. For them, $3600 in debt payments after taxes may well 
make a significant difference in the quality of life they can 
lead. If they have no dependents, they will still be better off 
than most Americans, but some may consider themselves no better 
off financially than they would have been if they had not gone to 
law school at all. 
B. Projected Burdens of Debt 
We now report our efforts to calculate the numbers of 
graduates within our survey who are likely to feel some 
discomfort, by either of the methods of calculation, on the basis 
of the actual information they have provided us about their 
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future jobs and expected individual and family earnings.4l 
For purposes of analysis, we found it helpful to divide the 
respondents into three groups. The first consists of those with 
jobs next year in positions other than judicial clerkships. For 
them, our best measure of their probable economic position in 
their first years after law school is their expected first-year 
earnings, figures we can compare to the probable size of the loan 
payments they will be making based on information about their 
total debts. The second group contains those with judicial 
clerkships. For this group, like the first, we can look at 
their expected earnings and probable loan payments during their 
clerkship, but we give greater attention to their forecast of the 
sort of setting in which they expect to work after the 
clerkship. The third group is made up of those who do not yet 
have jobs. For them, we report on the setting in which they 
think it is most likely they will find work. Among our 
respondents at the nine schools, 943 had jobs in hand in 
41 The survey asked several questions to aid in determining 
the respondents' likely financial position in the year 
immediately after law school. It first asked the respondents 
whether they had arranged a job for next year. If they had, it 
asked in what sort of setting and, if a firm, what size firm. It 
also asked them their expected first-year income. If they had not 
taken a job, it asked in what sort of setting they thought it 
most likely that they would be working. If they indicated that 
the job they believed they would have next year was a judicial 
clerkship, it asked them the sort of setting they expected to 
work in after the end of the clerkship. Finally, because it also 
bore on their financial position, the questionnaire at seven of 
the nine schools asked whether the respondent had a spouse or 
life partner with whom they were living and, if they did, what 
the probable income of that person would be for next year. See 
questionnaire in Appendix. 
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positions other than judicial clerks, 156 had taken judicial 
clerkships, and 283 had not yet taken a position with any 
employer. 
1. The Burdens for Those Who Had Accepted Jobs in Positions 
Other Than As Judicial Clerks 
At the time of our survey, 66 percent of all respondents had 
arranged for a job in a position other than a judicial clerkship. 
(The 11 percent with jobs as clerks we will discuss in the next 
section.) In general, those with jobs who attended the lower-
cost schools in Group A reported first-year expected earnings 
substantially lower than those who attended the higher-cost 
schools in Group B. The mean expected earnings of those who 
attended the Group A schools was $36,500. The mean expected 
earnings of those who attended the Group B schools was $54,600. 
The Group B graduates will earn much more on average than those 
in Group A largely because many more of the Group B graduates 
have taken jobs in large law firms,42 and the salaries in the 
large firms are, in general, substantially higher than those in 
the smaller firms and other settings where the Group A students 
more frequently find work. 
How much of these expected earnings will be consumed in 
paying off educational debts? We asked respondents their total 
accumulated debts, but because we feared that many either would 
not know or would not remember what they were going to be, we did 
not ask for their expected monthly or annual loan payments. 
42 See Table I. 
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Thus, in order to estimate loan payments in relation to income, 
we have made alternative assumptions based on the three sorts of 
payment plans that we have used in our illustrating tables. (See 
Tables VI and VII.) We then used the two methods of measuring 
debt burden already discussed--debt payments as a proportion of 
gross earnings and net disposable income after taxes and debt 
payments. 
Table IX uses the first approach to measuring the burdens of 
debt. For both the Group A and Group B graduates, it shows our 
calculations of probable debt payments in relation to earnings 
based on the actual debts and actual expected earnings of the 
respondents with debts. The table displays the median loan 
payment as a percent of reported individual income as well as the 
proportions of the graduates who will probably be paying more 
than 8, more than 10 or more than 12 percent of their gross 
income toward their loans. The 10 percent figure is the LSAC's 
suggested outside limit on the proportion of income a recent law 
graduate should consume in loan payments, and all three of the 
figures--a, 10, or 12 percent of gross income--are substantially 
higher than the levels recommended by other writers such as Horch 
and Daniere.43 
43 See text, supra, at notes 34 and 35. 
46 
Table IX 
Respondents with Any Debt 
and with a Job Next Year Other Than As a Judicial Clerk: 
Loan Payments as a Percent of Expected Pre-Tax Earnings, 
Nine Schools, Graduating Classes 1989 
If all students 
paid their loans 
at 9 percent over 
a 10-year term: 
Group A schools 
Group B schools 
If all students 
chose 9 percent, 
20-year 
payment plan: 
Group A schools 
Group B schools 
If all students 
N= 
120 
535 
120 
535 
chose 20 or 25-Year 
plan, with no 
principal payments 
during first 2 years: 
Group A schools 120 
Group B schools 535 
Median 
loan pyt 
as a % of 
pretax 
income* 
in 1st yr 
.. 
9.3% 
9.5% 
6.7% 
6.6% 
5.6% 
5.6% 
% paying 
more than 
8% of 
pre-tax 
income 
as loan 
payment 
57% 
59% 
39% 
35% 
29% 
26% 
% paying % paying 
more than more than 
10% of 12% of 
pre-tax pre-tax 
income income 
as loan as loan 
payment payment 
45% 35% 
46% 33% 
13% 
9% 
6% 
6% 
* Pretax income based on actual income reported as expected income 
by the respondents 
The first notable aspect of the figures in Table IX is that, 
despite the fact that the graduates of the higher-cost schools 
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tend to have accumulate larger debts than the graduates of the 
lower-cost schools, the graduates of the two sets of schools, as 
a group, will probably end up paying remarkably similar 
proportions of their gross incomes in debt payments. Whichever 
payment plan we assume, the median loan payments represent 
virtually identical proportions of income of the graduates of the 
two groups of schools. 
The second notable point is that, in general, loan payments 
will constitute a substantial pr?portion of the gross earnings of 
most of the respondents with debts. If none of the respondents 
consolidated their loans and all elected to pay them off at 9 
percent over a straight ten-year term, nearly half the students 
would be paying in their first year more than 10 percent of their 
gross income toward their loans (see upper part of table). Of 
course, many students will choose to consolidate, especially 
those with the largest debts. But, as the Table reveals, even if 
all were eligible for and chose to consolidate under the most 
favorable payment plan (the plan under which no principal 
payments are required in the opening years), the median level of 
payments would still be 5.6 percent of gross earnings or roughly 
7 to 8 percent of net earnings after taxes. Seven to eight 
percent of net earnings is roughly the level that Horch and 
Daniere suggest as the outer limit of comfort in paying debts. 
We cannot know how many people will in fact choose to 
consolidate. Some borrowers are not eligible for the federally 
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supported consolidation programs,44 and others will be quite 
reluctant to tie themselves to escalating payments into the 
distant future (even though they can prepay and even though they 
would be paying with inflated dollars) . Since our goal is to 
understand who will feel financially strapped in the years 
immediately after law school, the greatest concern should be for 
those who will feel strapped even though they take advantage of 
ways to reduce the initial year's payments. As such, looking at 
the burdens that would be faced if all the respondents picked one 
of the two lower-payment plans illustrated in the Tables (the 
bottom two sets of figures in Table IX) seems a reasonable 
measure of the burden. 
Look again at that part of Table IX. If we use the measure 
of burden suggested by the LSAC--that recent law graduates should 
not pay out each year more than 10 percent of their gross income 
toward their debt--then between 12 and 20 percent of the Group A 
students with any debts and between 14 and 24 percent of the 
Group B students with any debts (the underlined numbers in the 
table) will be paying out during their first year at a higher 
level than the LSAC recommends. That is roughly one in five or 
one in six of all the students with debts who had jobs in hand 
at graduation (not counting the judicial clerks) . 
What sorts of debts and debt burdens are being carried by 
44 As stated earlier, only federally guaranteed loans can be 
consolidated under the advantageous terms. Loans from private 
lenders or loans from a law school's own loan funds are not 
eligible for the federal consolidation programs. 
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these students with high payments in relation to their incomes? 
Quite high. Consider the students, 89 in all, who will pay out 10 
percent or more of their gross income, even if they select the 
plan that defers principal payments. At the lower-cost Group A 
schools, this group reports that they expect to earn, on 
average, $25,300 in their first year, while carrying debts 
averaging $35,800. They will thus be making annual payments 
averaging $3222 or 12.7 percent of their pretax income. The 
comparable group of students from the Group B schools earn more--
an average of $37,700--but pay out much the same proportion•of 
their income. They report debts averaging $55,000 and will make 
annual payments averaging $4950, payments which represent an 
average of 13.1 percent of their gross income. By any of the 
recommended standards, this is a substantial burden. 
How students get into this position of heavy debt in 
relation to earnings is a question that is impossible to answer 
with any certainty on the data we have. A part of the answer is 
probably very simple: many students borrow what it takes to get 
them through school; they then seek the highest paying jobs they 
can find (consistent with other goals) and, even so, simply end 
up with very high payments in relation to the earnings available 
to them. 
We find an intriguing correlation between law school grades 
and debt burdens that may shed some added light on this simple 
explanation. At both the Group A schools and the Group B 
schools, those students who, by our computations, will be paying 
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10 percent or more of their income toward their loans had, on 
average, substantially lower grades than the students with lesser 
burdens in relation to their incomes. At the Group B schools, 
for example, of those with debt who will be paying less than 8 
percent of gross income toward their debts (a safe group, in the 
view of the LSAC), 37 percent reported themselves in the top 
quarter of their class and only 34 percent in the bottom two 
quarters.45 By contrast, of the pressed group who will be making 
payments equalling more than 10 percent of their gross income, 
only 3 percent were in the top quarter of their class and 71 
percent were in the bottom two quarters.46 One possible 
explanation for this strong relationship between grades and 
probable debt burden is that those with lower grades at the end 
of law school start borrowing in their first year at the same 
levels as everyone else, keep on borrowing at that level even 
after they do less well academically than their classmates, and, 
by the end of law school have borrowed as much as (or more 
than)47 the rest of their classmates but simply do not as 
45 Here again, we are looking at the group who would be paying 
out 10 percent of their income even if they chose the plan that 
permits them to defer payments of principal. 
46 The story was much the same at the group A schools. There, of 
those with debts who will probably be paying less than 8 percent 
of gross income toward· their debts, 45 percent were in the top 
quarter of their class and only 26 percent were in the bottom two 
quarters, whereas, of those who will likely be paying 10 percent 
or more, only 17 percent were in the top quarter and 61 percent 
were in the bottom two quarters. 
47 One puzzlement is that, at the Group B schools, there is a 
strong correlation between total educational debt and law . 
school performance--the lower the students' grades the more he or 
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frequently receive offers to work in the highest paying 
settings.48 
By our first measure of debt burden--payments due as a 
proportion of expected gross income--we have now seen that about 
a fifth or sixth of the students with debt at the Group A and 
Group B schools will be paying out 10 percent or more of their 
first-year earnings in debt payments. When we shift to our 
second measure of burden and look simply at how many dollars of 
disposable income our respondents are likely to have left after 
paying their taxes and their loans installments, our findings 
are, as expected, somewhat different. As Table X reveals, by 
this method if we again assume that all students take the most 
favorable consolidation plan that permits them to defer principal 
payments, somewhat more of the Group A students--but many fewer 
of the Group B students--seem likely to experience financial 
difficulties. (The results are only slightly different if 
students choose the 20-year consolidated payment plan in which 
she is likely to have borrowed by the end of law school. The 
pattern holds for both white and minority students. One possible 
(but untested) explanation for this pattern is that the students 
with the higher grades obtain the higher-paying summer jobs or 
part-time jobs during law school and find they need to borrow 
less. Another explanation is that at some schools, students with 
higher grades receive more scholarship money and thus need not 
borrow as much. 
48 Another possible explanation for this relationship between 
grades and debt burden is that those with high debts are more 
likely than those with lower debts to have paid employment during 
law school which interferes with academic achievement. 
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they make both interest and principal payments.)49 
Group A 
Group B 
Table X 
Disposable Income after Taxes and 
Debt Payments on Lowest Payment Plan, 
Based on Income Reported by Respondents with Debts 
and with Jobs Other Than as Judicial Clerks, 
Nine Schools, 1989 
Median 9.:-
" 
with 
Median Median disposable disposable 
gross income income after income 
N= income after taxes and less than 
taxes* debt pyts** $20,000 
Schools 102 $34,000 $24,480 $22,550 35% 
Schools 521 $57,000 $38,190 $34,833 8% 
* Taking into account federal income taxes for a single person, 
Social Security taxes, and an estimate of state and municipal taxes. 
See Kramer, Who Will Pay the Piper or Leave the Check on the Table 
for the Other Guy, 39 J. of Legal Education 655, 673-77 (1989). 
** Debt payments based on multiplying each students' reported total 
debt by .09, the interest rate on consolidated loans. Under the 
Lawloans Program students can defer principal payments for two or 
four years, if their loans qualify for deferral. 
Table IX reveals that, even after paying their taxes and 
loan installments, the median borrower at the more expensive 
Group B schools still has almost $35,000 in disposable income. 
That median borrower is, as we have seen before, paying roughly 6 
percent of her gross earnings toward her debts, but she still has 
49 If all students chose to consolidate their loans at a 
flat rate across the 20 years (instead of deferring principal 
payments) , the students at the Group A schools would have median 
incomes of $22,350 (rather than the $22,550 we estimate in Table 
XI) and the students at the Group B schools would have median 
incomes of $34,167 (rather than the $34,833 we estimate in the 
Table.) Only slightly more of the students at each group of 
schools would have disposable incomes of less than $20,000. 
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lots of income left over. Only 8 percent of the Group B students 
with jobs in settings other than judicial clerkships end up 
with disposable income of less than $20,000. Even the group that 
we were worrying about a few pages back--the graduates paying 10 
percent or more of their gross income toward their loans--will, 
if they are graduates of one of the Group B schools, typically 
end up with more than $20,000 in disposable income.50 
Table X also reveals that, even the more modest earning 
graduates of the Group A schools will have, as a median, $22,550 
of disposable income after taxes and debt payments. Among Group 
A's graduates, but not Group B's, there is nonetheless a 
substantial group of persons--35 percent of the students with 
debt--who, after taxes and debt payments, will .have disposable 
income of less than $20,000. (In fact, 14 percent in fact will 
have disposable incomes of less than $15,000.) Their modest net 
incomes in comparison to most of their classmates is not, of 
course, due primarily to their loan payments. These are persons 
with comparatively low base salaries, most of them about to begin 
jobs in small firms or government. A few of those whom we 
expect to have disposable incomes of less than $20,000 expect to 
have gross income before taxes of less than $20,000 and several 
more will have net income after taxes but before their debt 
50 At the Group B schools, as reported above, the group who 
will be paying 10 percent or more of their gross income toward 
their loans had, on average, gross income of $37,700 and after-
tax income of around $28,300, so that with debt payments 
averaging $4950, they would have, on average, disposable incomes 
of $23,350. 
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payments of less than $20,ooo.51 Still, even if the debt 
payments are not the largest factor in their lower income, the 
payments, whatever they are, will have a larger effect on their 
actual standard of living than the payments of most of those with 
much higher incomes • 
. 
2. The Burdens for Those with Jobs as Judicial Clerks 
Judicial clerkships are a modest paying job among starting 
jobs for lawyers. Within our sample, the great majority of the 
graduates with clerkships--about 75 percent--expected to earn 
between $25,000 and $30,000 during their clerkship year. Not 
surprisingly, many will be making large debt payments in 
relation to their earnings. For the purposes of this study, 
however, it makes little sense to devote much attention to the 
economic position of clerks because clerkships typically last 
only one year and the comparatively low earnings during that year 
are little or no guide to the probable earnings of the clerk in 
the years that follow. On average, students with clerkships at 
nearly all the schools we surveyed had higher grades than the 
students entering any other type of work.52 Many of the clerks 
expect to go into highly paid work in large private firms. 
For this reason, we asked persons with clerkships both their 
51 Fourteen persons (or roughly 2 percent) of the 633 
borrowers for whom we had earnings and debt information had net 
earnings after taxes of more than $20,000 but disposable income 
of ~ess than $20,000 after making their loan payments. 
52 At the eight schools for which we had information about 
academic performance, over half of those who had taken jobs as 
clerks reported themselves in the highest quartile in their class. 
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expected earnings during their clerkships and their most 
probable setting for work after they completed their clerkship. 
Among our respondents, 177 persons, 14 percent of all 
respondents, expect to be working in a judicial clerkship, 
roughly the same proportion at the group A and group B schools.53 
As Table XI reveals, many clerks will be paying a substantial 
part of their earnings toward their debts during their clerkship 
year, even if they all consolidated their loans and elected the 
lowest payment plan. In fact, even on this assumption, about a 
quarter of the clerks from the Group A schools and over half the 
clerks from the Group B schools will be expending 10 percent or 
more of their gross earnings toward their loan payments. More 
Group B than Group A school clerks will pay out a high percentage 
of their earnings because the clerkship jobs available to the 
Group A graduates pay as much, on average, as the clerkships 
available to the Group B graduates, but as we have already seen, 
the graduates of the Group B schools have, in general, borrowed 
much more and face higher loan payments. 
In some regards, Table XI overstates the annualized burden 
on the clerks, since, under many programs, no loan payments are 
due until six months after graduation. What the Table displays 
is the proportion of monthly earnings that will be consumed once 
payments start coming due. 
53 156 had accepted jobs as clerk at the time of our 
survey; an additional 21 (half of them at one school) did not 
have a clerkship yet but expected to receive one. Many of these 
were at one Group A school where state judges apparently wait 
until late Spring of the third year before picking their clerks. 
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Table XI 
Information about Debt Burdens of Judicial Clerks 
During Their Clerkship Year, 
Nine Schools, Graduating Classes 1989 
Number expecting to work 
as judicial clerks 
Mean earnings 
Percentage of clerks with some debt 
Among clerks with debts: 
Assuming lowest payment plan,* 
debt payment during clerking 
year as a percent of gross 
monthly earnings (median) 
Assuming lowest payment plan, 
percent who will 
expend toward loan payments: 
more than 8% of gross earnings 
more than 10 of gross earnings 
more than 12% of gross earnings 
Group A 
Schools 
Group B 
Schools 
52 of 345 (15%) 125 of 954 (13%) 
$29,100 $28,900 
80% 73% 
6.5% 
28% 
24% 
16% 
11.0% 
66% 
58% 
43% 
* Payment plan under which students consolidate loans and pay 
interest at 9 percent but no principal payments during 
first two or four years. 
As reported earlier, at neither the Group A nor Group B 
schools did students seem to be avoiding clerkships because of 
the prospect of heavy debt payments.54 The table above bears 
further witness to the attraction of clerkships: that roughly 58 
percent of the Group B school clerks will be paying more than 10 
percent of their gross earnings toward their loan payments during 
54 See Section IIIB1 pebts and Decisions to Take a Judicial 
Clerkship. 
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their clerkship year strongly suggests, in itself, that, for many 
students, the prospect of heavy debt payments during that year 
serves as little, if any, deterrent to working for a judge. 
What will the clerks do after they complete their clerkship? 
Is it safe to assume that they will then be in a position to pay 
off their loans with comfort? About a sixth of the clerks did 
not respond to the question asking for their most probable work 
setting after their clerkship or said that they didn't know where 
they would be working. Some who did indicate a probable work 
setting indicated more than one.55 Of those who forecast where 
they would work, two-thirds planned to work in private practice, 
but a surprisingly high number indicated a plan to work in one 
of the three settings that typically offer lesser earnings than 
others. Of the clerks who graduated from the Group A schools, 40 
percent said that they planned to work ~n government, legal 
services (or other public interest setting}, or a small firm. Of 
the clerks who graduated from the Group B schools, 35 percent 
said that they planned to work in one of these settings. 
Since we cannot know the earnings that clerks will have in 
the jobs they take after their clerkships, the most we can do 
toward identifying those who may feel strained in paying their 
loans is to look at the debts of the fifty-two clerks who say 
they plan to enter one of the three generally lower-paying 
55 About 15 percent of those with plans indicated two 
possible post-clerkship settings. Seven people indicated they 
planned to work in a firm or in government or in a firm or legal 
services. We counted these people as planning to work in 
government or legal services respectively. 
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settings. The fifty-two included many people with substantial 
educational debts. As Table XII displays, thirty-five percent 
of those expecting to work in lower-paying settings have debts of 
$30,000 or more. Nearly all were at Group B schools. The median 
debts of those who had debts of $30,000 or more was $43,000. If 
a former clerk earned, say, $33,000 in a government agency or 
small firm in the first year after the clerkship and had a debt 
of $43,000, she would expend about 13 percent of her pretax 
income in loan payments, even if she elected the lowest payment 
plan during the initial years after law school. That is well 
above the LSAC maximum recommended level of 10 percent. A person 
with a lower debt of $30,000 but the same earnings of $33,000 
would be paying about 10 percent of pretax earnings, right at the 
LSAC recommended maximum. 
Table XII 
Educational Debts of Clerks Who Plan to Work in Government, 
Legal Services or Small Firms After the Clerkship, 
Nine Schools, Graduating Classes 1989 
Proportion with educational debts of 
$30,000 $40,000 $50,000 
or more or more or more 
Total 
n= n= percent n= percent n= percent 
of total of total of total 
52 18 35% 10 19% 4 8% 
Median debts of those with debts of over $30,000--$43,000 
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3. The Burdens for Those Who Did Not Have Jobs at the Time 
of the survey 
At the time of the survey in April of their last year of law 
school, 21 percent of the respondents--283 persons in 
all--responded "no" to the question "Do you have a job arranged 
for next year?" Forty percent of the graduates of the Group A 
schools and 15 percent of the graduates of the Group B schools 
reported that they did not have jobs. 
The most worrisome group among those who said that they did 
not have a job were those who had no answer to a follow-up 
question that asked those without jobs what sort of job they 
thought it was most likely they would eventually take. Fifteen 
percent of those without jobs left blank the answer to this 
question or answered that they did not know. As a group, those 
without jobs who indicated no probable job setting had lower law 
school grades than those without jobs who indicated where they 
expected to work (and much lower grades than those with jobs in 
hand) .56 A disproportionate number of those without jobs and 
without stated expectations were minority group members.57 It 
56 Among those with jobs, only 11 percent placed themselves in 
the bottom quartile of their class. Among those without jobs but 
who reported a particular setting in which they thought it likely 
that they would be working, 26 percent reported themselves in the 
bottom quarter. But, among those without a job and without any 
stated plan for a job, 46 percent reported themselves in the 
bottom quarter (and another 27 percent reported themselves in the 
third quarter) . 
57 Thirty percent of the persons without jobs and without 
expectations were nonwhite, in comparison to 16 percent of the 
respondents in the survey as a whole. 
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may well be that this group without jobs or plans will include a 
substantial number who will have difficulty finding a job as a 
lawyer at all. (The National Association for Law Placement 
reports that, of the class of 1988 at American law schools, 7 
percent were unemployed six months after graduation and another 
2 percent were working parttime only.)58 
Among those without jobs, concerns do not stop with those 
who indicated no expected setting for work. As a group, those 
without jobs who did report an expected setting had very 
different expectations for the jobs they would eventually obtain 
than did those who had already arranged a position, different 
expectations of direct relevance to this inquiry. Among those 
with jobs in hand,59 39 percent of those attending the lower cost 
Group A schools and 12 percent of those attending the higher cost 
Group B schools indicated that they had taken jobs in a small 
firm, government or legal services, the three lower paying 
settings. By contrast, of those who had not yet taken a job, 67 
percent of those attending the Group A schools and 33 percent of 
those attending the Group B schools, indicated that they 
expected to find a job in one of the three lower-paying settings. 
Why did so many more of those without a job by April of 
their third year expect a job in one of the lower paying 
settings? Briefly, there are probably two principal reasons. 
58 NALP, Class of 1988 Employment Report and Salary Survey, at 
1 (G. Peschel ed. 1990). 
59 Excluding those with jobs as clerks. 
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First, government agencies, legal services offices and very 
small firms are frequently either unable to make commitments on 
new positions many months in advance or unwilling to make 
commitments until the recent graduate has passed the bar. And, 
second, within schools, those without jobs tended to be persons 
with lower academic records60 and, as we have seen above, those 
with higher grades tended to have taken the jobs as judicial 
clerks; they were also more likely to have obtained jobs as 
associates in the larger firms. 
Whatever the reason, a large number of persons without 
jobs--130 in all--expected to take jobs in one of the three lower 
paying settings and, as we have seen, an additional 43 persons 
without jobs did not report any expected setting for work. 
Since few of these 173 persons without jobs guessed what 
they would be earning in the year after their graduation, we have 
the same problem in calculating how much of their earnings are 
likely to be tied up in loan payments that we do for the judicial 
clerks in their jobs after their clerkships. As with the clerks, 
the best we can do, as revealed in Table XIII, is to identify 
those who indicate a likelihood of being in a lower-earning 
setting or who gave no indication of any job setting and see how 
many of them reported high debts. 
60 Of those without jobs, 6 percent were in the top 
quartile of their class and 30 percent were in the bottom 
quartile. Of those with jobs, 36 percent were in the top 
quartile and 11 percent were in the bottom quartile. 
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Table XIII 
Educational Debts of Persons Without Jobs 
Who Indicated That They Were Likely 
to Be Working in Government, Legal Services or 
Small Firms or Who Indicated No Job Plans at Al~ 
Nine Schools, Graduating Classes 1989 
Proportion with Educational Debts of: 
$30,000 $40,000 $50,000 
o;r mo;re or more or more 
Total 
n= n= percent n= percent n= percent 
of total of total of total 
154* 50 31% 23 15% 13 8% 
Median debts of those with debts of over $30,000--$38,000 
* There were 173 persons without jobs who indicated an 
expectation to work in government, legal services or a small firm 
or who gave no indication of any plans, but only 154 of this 
group answered the question about debts. 
As Table XIII reveals, 31 percent of those without jobs who 
do not have plans or whose expectations were for work in a small 
firm, government, or legal services will be carrying debts of 
$30,000 or more. If it takes many months for some of this group 
to find employment, some will find that loan payments are coming 
due before they have earned incomes with which to make the 
payments.61 
61 The burdens may be less severe for those within this 
group who have working partners, but only 22 percent of the group 
do have a working partner, a smaller percentage than is the case 
for the more fortunate group who already had jobs in hand. 
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4. Summary of the Debt Burdens 
Three groups of graduating students have been identified who 
may well feel pinched in paying off their debts: (1) those with 
jobs next year in positions other than as judicial clerks whose 
debt payments, assuming a consolidated 20-year payment plan, are 
likely to exceed 10 percent of their estimated gross incomes;62 
(2) those working next year as judicial clerks who have debts of 
$30,000 or more and who plan to work, after their clerkship, in a 
small firm, in government or in legal services;63 and (3} those 
who had no job at the end of their third year, had debts of 
$30,000 or more and who either reported no expected setting of 
62 See section IV B1, supra. In that section (see 
particularly Table IX) , we gave illustrations based on 
alternative assumptions about the payment plans students might 
elect. The two consolidated payments plans assure lower monthly 
payments for students. Under the most advantageous of these plans 
(as measured solely by keeping the payments due as low as 
possible during the initial year), students would pay interest 
only--that is .09 times their debt--during their initial year 
(see last illustration in Table X). Under the other consolidated 
plan, students would make both interest and principal payments 
but would spread their payments out over 20 years. Under this 
plan, annual payments equal 10.8 percent of the total debt. (See 
middle illustration in Table X.) Because the consolidation plans 
are available only for federally-guaranteed loans and because, 
even for those who can consolidate, the 9 percent rate is 
available only to those whose loans were predominately at the 
lowest interest rates among the federal loans, it seems 
inappropriate to assume that everyone will be paying (or could 
choose to be paying) at the lowest rate. For purposes of this 
section, we have made a middle assumption. We have assumed that 
everyone is making payments each year not equal to 9 percent or 
10.8 percent of their total loan amount, but rather equal to 10 
percent of their total loan amount. That rate of payment is 
higher than the 9 percent maximally advantageous rate, but still 
vastly lower than the 15.2 percent of the total loan amount that 
is paid annually by those who do not consolidate and pay over a 
10-year period. (See first illustration in Table X.) 
63 See Section IV B2, supra. 
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work or reported expecting to work in a small firm, in government 
or in legal services.64 
The good news from our study is that of the 1172 persons 
for whom we have adequate information about debts, 84 percent fit 
into none of these three groups. See Table XIV. Roughly 20 
percent of our respondents had no educational debt at all, and of 
the others who did and who fit into none of the three risk 
groups, the median person (among those who did have a job and 
knew their earnings) will be paying between 5 and 7 percent of 
her gross earnings in debt payments, assuming she adopts one of 
the debt consolidation plans.65 That is comfortably within the 
range suggested by the Law School Admission Council. For the 
great majority of these borrowers, their loan payments will be a 
monthly annoyance, but not a significant burden. For many of 
this group, perhaps most, loans will have made law school 
possible, and the jobs available to them after law school will 
make the payments easily affordable. For them, law school will 
have been a very good deal.66 
64 See Section IV B3, supra. 
65 Compare Table IX. It includes all students with debt. 
66 See R. Ehrenberg, An Economic Analysis of the Market for 
Law School Students, 39 J. of Legal Ed. 627 (1989). 
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Table XIV 
Debt Burdens in First Year After Law School 
Faced by Respondents at Nine Schools, 
Graduating Classes, 1989 
Students with no debts 
Students with debts who should 
not experience substantial 
burden in paying off their 
loans 
Three groups likely to 
be burdened by debt: 
Persons with job next year 
who will expend over io 
percent of gross income 
in loan payments* 
Judicial clerks with high 
debts planning to work 
after clerkship in lower 
pay setting** 
Persons without job for next 
year who have high debts 
and expect to work in lower 
pay setting*** 
N= % 
230 20% 
84% 
750 64 
124 10 
16% 
18 2 
50 4 
1172 100% 
* Excluding judicial clerks. Assumes loan payments made on a 
consolidated plan at 9 percent interest. See explanation in n.62. 
** High debt defined as a debt of at least $30,000; lower pay 
settings include government, legal services, public defenders, 
public interest firms, and firms of fewer than 10 lawyers. 
*** For definitions of high debt and lower pay settings, see 
preceding note. Also included here were persons without jobs 
next year and without any reported expected setting for a job. 
As in every tale of plenty, however, a few will do less well 
than others. By our rough calculations, 172 persons will be in 
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one of the three groups we identify as likely to feel somewhat 
burdened. Those 172 persons represent about 16 percent of all 
respondents to the survey--14 percent of the respondents at the 
Group A schools and 17 percent of the respondents at the Group B 
schools.67 Many of those in the burdened group do not yet have 
a job for next year. Of those who do have jobs, those in the 
burdened group with jobs other than as clerks will be paying, on 
average, 13.9 percent of their gross income toward their loans 
or nearly 20 percent of their net income after taxes. 
Our calculations of the group likely to feel burdened are 
necessarily very rough. In some senses, they are conservative 
~nd underestimate the numbers likely to feel burdened. No 
graduates with a job next year are included unless, if they 
chose to repay their loans on a 20-year consolidated basis, they 
would make payments that represented 10 percent or more of their 
gross income. Yet many of our respondents who expect to earn 
$25,000 or $30,000 and who will pay 8 or 9 percent of their gross 
earnings will also feel squeezed. Similarly excluded are 
persons who did not have a job at graduation but who reported 
expecting a job in a midsized or large firm. If the members of 
this group obtain the jobs they are expecting, most will probably 
experience no burden at all. But some of this group have very 
high debts and will probably feel pinched even if they obtain a 
job in a high-paying setting. And others will not secure the 
67 The 172 potentially burdened students also represent about 
percent of all the respondents with any educational debt. 
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jobs they expect and will end up, contrary to their hopes, in 
lesser-paying settings. 
In other important senses, however, we have probably 
overestimated the size of the burdened group. We have done so in 
at least three ways. First, for those who reported their 
expected earnings, we have calculated the group likely to feel 
burdened by reference to the percentage of their gross earnings 
going toward their loan payments, rather than in terms of their 
probable disposable income after making loan payments. For 
example, we are counting as burdened thirty-one persons who 
reported that they will have gross earnings of $40,000 or more 
(roughly 5 percent of the group earning at least $40,000) on the 
ground that they had large loans and will be paying more than 10 
percent of the gross income toward their loans, above the line 
suggested by the Law School Admission Council. If the studies of 
others are a guide, members of this group are likely to feel that 
their loan payments cut deeply into their disposable income. And 
yet, even after making large loan payments and paying all taxes, 
almost all of this group earning $40,000 or more will have 
disposable incomes of more than $20,000,68 and will be able to 
live quite comfortably, at least in the view of most Americans. 
A second way in which the figures for burden are likely to 
be overstated is that our calculations of burden are based solely 
68 This group earning over $40,000 whom we have overcounted 
is probably roughly equal in size to the undercount described 
above caused by excluding persons earning $25,000 to $30,000, 
whose debts will feel substantial to them but whose payments will 
represent slightly less than 10 percent of their gross earnings. 
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on the earnings of the respondent and do not count the earnings 
of any spouse or unmarried life partner of the respondent. 
(Hereafter we will call such a person a "partner.") At seven of 
the nine schools we surveyed, we learned whether the respondent 
had a partner and, if so, the respondent's estimate of the 
earnings the partner would have during the coming year. 
Roughly 40 percent of the persons in our sample had a 
partner, although not all of the partners were employed. (Some 
partners were students; others were the fulltime caretakers of 
children.) The average earnings of those partners who were 
employed, however, were high--around $34,700.69 In fact, eleven 
of our respondents had partners who expected to earn $100,000 or 
more during the coming year. A person with a high-earning 
partner with whom they shared income can afford, of course, to 
expend much more than 10 percent of his or her own earnings on 
loan payments and still live extremely comfortably. 
If we take partners and the earnings of partners into 
account, how many of our respondents would still be in one of the 
high-burden groups? At the 7 schools for which we had partner 
information, there were 131 persons who fit into one of our three 
high-burden groups. Of these 131, 28 had partners whom they 
expected to earn $15000 or more in the coming year. Thus, at 
69 Not surprisingly, women tended to have higher earning 
partners than men. Among men, 24 percent had partners whom they 
expected to have no earnings next year and, of those with working 
partners, the average partner was expected to earn $27,700. By 
contrast, 11 percent of women had partners whom they expected to 
have no earnings next year and, of those with working partners, 
the average expected earnings was $42,400. 
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these seven schools, roughly 21 percent of our high burden 
group, as calculated on the basis of their individual earnings, 
should probably not be seen as burdened at all.70 (On the other 
hand, about 10 percent of the respondents whom we placed in the 
high burden group on the basis of their individual income should 
probably be treated as doubly burdened for they had partners whom 
they expected either to be unemployed or employed at low earnings 
during the coming year.) 
In future studies of debt burdens, more attention needs to 
be given to partners, the partners' own educational debts, and 
partners' earnings. We lacked information from two of the 
schools we studied; we did not learn about the partners' 
educational debts; and we did not learn whether partners had 
prospects, like most of the lawyers, of higher and higher 
earnings over time. Moreover, of course, no question we could 
plausibly have asked on our brief questionnaire would have 
revealed the stability of the relationship between of the 
respondent and the partner and thus the degree to which the 
respondent could depend on the partner's contributions over the 
term of the repayment. 
The third way in which we have overstated the debt burden is 
by our emphasis on the first year after law school. Even if our 
forecast of that first year proved fully accurate, that year, for 
70 Interestingly, somewhat fewer of those whom we calculate 
to have high burdens on the basis of their individual incomes had 
partners than did those who do not bear high burdens (suggesting 
in itself that few persons are building up large debts in the 
expectation that a well-off partner will help make the payments) . 
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most of the respondents, will be the lowest-earning year in their 
career. In later years, as their incomes rise, their debt 
payments (except for those who choose a scheme of graduated 
payments) will remain constant and constitute a smaller and 
smaller proportion of their income. As time goes by, many who 
are now single will marry or form longterm relationships with 
other working professionals and their debt payments will decline 
even further in relation to their family income. 
So why worry? The worry, to the extent that there is one, 
is that not everyone will share in the prosperity. Some within 
our survey are not sharing in it at the point of graduation and 
some will not come to share in it at all. We began this summary 
section by pointing to the 16 percent of our respondents who seem 
likely to feel burdened in their first year after law school. If 
we look more closely at this burdened group, we will see that it 
is overrepresented with persons who may also have the least 
promising prospects for high earnings in the future. Consider 
in Table XV, which reports on groups that include few persons 
likely to feel burdened and groups that include a higher 
proportion likely to feel burdened. 
71 
Table XV 
High and Low Debt Burden* Groups 
Nine Law Schools, Graduating Class 1989 
Proportion of group 
likely to feel some 
burden in making debt 
N= payments* 
Groups with few high-burden students 
Students who said they were 
in top quartile of their 
class 
Students expecting jobs 
in large firms (50-
150 attorneys) 
Students expecting jobs 
in very large firms 
(more than 150 attorneys) 
315 
235 
255 
Groups with Many High-Burden Students 
Students who said they were 
in bottom quartile of 
their class** 
African-American and Hispanic 
students 
Persons expecting jobs in 
government (not counting 
judicial clerkships) 
Persons expecting jobs in 
legal services or other 
"public interest" work 
Persons expecting jobs in 
small firms (1 to 10 attys) 
172 
129 
127 
51 
125 
7% 
10% 
6% 
28% 
24% 
30% 
50% 
24% 
* For purposes of this Table, students were considered likely to 
experience burden only if they fit into one of the three 
following categories: (1) They had jobs next year in positions 
other than as judicial clerks and their debt payments, assuming a 
consolidated 20-year payment plan, were, by our calculations, 
likely to exceed 10 percent of their estimated gross incomes (see 
note 62); or (2) they were working next year as judicial clerks, 
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had debts of $30,000 or more, and said that they planned to work, 
after their clerkship, in a small firm, in government or in legal 
services; or (3) they had no job at the end of law school, had 
debts of $30,000 or more, and either reported no expected setting 
of work or reported expecting to work in a small firm, in 
government or in legal services. 
** Quartiles were self-reported at several schools. As can be 
seen from this table, many more respondents placed themselves in 
the first quartile than in the last. 
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As Table XV reveals, persons with low grades in law school 
and persons who were African-American or Hispanic were 
substantially more likely than their non-Hispanic white 
classmates to be in one of the high-burden groups.71 They were 
more likely than others to have no job by the end of law school 
or to have a job (or expect a job) in one of the lower paying 
settings. At the Group B schools in our survey, they also, on 
average, had accumulated higher debts than their classmates.72 
Our worry, of course, is that their economic problems will not be 
transitory--that they will endure for the particular students we 
have been studying and persist for future similar graduates of 
the same schools. 
The same concerns can be voiced for those students, minority 
and other, entering government, legal services and small firms. 
As Table XV displays, a high proportion of the students entering 
or expecting to enter these settings will probably feel somewhat 
burdened by their debts in their first year after law school. In 
fact, based on the figures they gave us about their expected 
first-year earnings, 25 percent of those entering government or 
71 In a regression in which being in one of the high burden 
groups or not was a binary dependent variable and racejethnic 
group and law school grade quartile were controls, law school 
quartile is strongly related to being in a high burden group, 
and race, after controls, bears little relation. The relationship 
between being in one of the three burden groups and being black, 
hispanic or native american is still positive, but most of the 
significance is accounted for by grades. 
72 Among students with debts at the Group B schools, 
African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans had an average 
debt of $39,200, while non-Hispanic whites had an average debt of 
$34,500. 
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legal services (excluding the judicial clerks) and 17 percent of 
those entering small firms will probably have disposable incomes 
of less than $15,000, after paying taxes and loan installments. 
The problem for many of the persons entering these settings is 
likely to persist beyond the first year. Within our own sample, 
starting salaries in government, legal services and other public 
interest work were, on average, less than half the starting 
salaries at the very large firms.73 Moreover, annual pay 
increases of eight percent or more have been common in the very 
large firms, but not, by any means, in government, legal services 
and other public interest work. In these latter settings, 
workers have been fortunate if their annual raises keep pace with 
increases in the costs of living. 
Some confirmation of the difficulties facing those with low 
grades and those in certain job settings comes from a survey 
conducted by mail in January 1990 of the 1987 graduates of one of 
the Group B schools in our survey. The survey primarily concerned 
the jobs the respondents had taken, but, near the end, 
respondents were asked for their total educational debts on 
graduation and, on a 7-point scale, the difficulty they had 
encountered in the two and one-half years since graduation in 
paying off their loans. Category 1 on the scale was labeled "no 
difficulty at all" and category 7 was labelled "a great deal of 
difficulty." Of those with debts, over a quarter put themselves 
in category 1, no difficulty at all, but 33 percent placed 
73 6 See supra, n. . 
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themselves in categories 4 through 7. Most likely to report 
difficulty, not surprisingly, were those with the highest debts, 
but even after taking the size of debts into account, those with 
the lowest grades in law school and those who had taken jobs 
after law school in government (not including judicial 
clerkships) or in legal services were significantly more likely 
than others to say that they had encountered difficulties.74 
A final way in which the burdens of debt are unevenly 
distributed is that some schools have many more graduates likely 
to feel pinched than other schools. At one of our Group A 
schools, only 5 percent of the students fit within one of the 
three burdened groups. This was the school with the lowest 
tuition among our nine schools and the school whose graduates 
reported the lowest average debt burdens. By contrast, at one of 
the Group B schools, 26 percent of the students seem likely to be 
burdened. This school had a high tuition and, among the Group B 
schools, the lowest proportion of graduates entering large firms. 
We warned at the beginning that we did not have a representative 
sample of law schools within our study. Our findings about the 
uneven distribution of burdened students among schools gives a 
74 About 70 percent of the class responded to the survey. 
Among those with debts, 69 percent of those in the bottom 
quartile of the class by grades and 43 percent of the third 
quartile in the class put themselves into categories 4 through 7, 
in comparison with 17 percent of those in the top quartile of the 
class. Similarly, fifty-six percent of those whose first job 
after law school (after any judicial clerkship) was in 
government, legal services or public interest work put themselves 
into categories 4 through 7 in comparison to only 19 percent of 
those whose first postclerkship job had been in a firm of more 
than 50 lawyers. 
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basis for especial concern for the graduates of schools with 
comparatively high tuitions that send comparatively few graduates 
into jobs in the highest-paying settings. 
V. Conclusions and Suggestions 
We in law teaching have much for which to be grateful. 
Despite the large sums that students are borrowing, the great 
majority of the graduates of the nine schools we studied--and 
probably the great majority of law school graduates in general--
were, as of 1989, obtaining jobs that would permit them to pay 
their educational loans without serious discomfort. 
We nonetheless have two causes for concern. The first is 
that a significant minority of the graduates seem likely to feel 
quite pinched in making their loan payments in their first years 
after law school. The pinched group is likely to include 
disproportionate numbers of the African-American and Hispanic 
graduates and disproportionate numbers of the graduates of some 
schools. The second is that there is now some evidence, thin but 
measurable, of a relationship between job choices and size of 
debts and thus evidence that the prospects of high loan payments 
may be driving some students away from jobs in government, legal 
services and public interest work. 
The prospects for the next several years are not 
particularly encouraging. During 1990 and 1991, many private 
firms and government agencies hired fewer beginning lawyers than 
they had in the recent past. Entry salaries in many settings 
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either were frozen at the level of the year before or rose at a 
slower pace than they had over the preceding several years. At 
the same time, at most schools, the amounts of money students 
were borrowing apparently continued to rise. Harder times may 
well lie ahead. 
What can law schools do about the burdens of debts and the 
possible effects of debts in job choice? In some senses, not 
much. Law schools have no control over the·demand for new 
lawyers or over the salaries employers will pay. They do control 
tuition increases but have limited control over most of the 
operating costs that lead them to increase their tuitions. 
What law schools can do is quite modest. One small, 
constructive step is for schools to learn more about their own 
graduates. The study being launched by the LSAC to examine the 
bar passage of minority and white law students will provide, as a 
valuable by-product, an opportunity to learn more about the size 
and effects of students' debts. In the meantime, individual 
schools can easily replicate what we have done here. They can 
match up their students' reports of their first jobs with 
information about the students' grades and loans and learn 
whether, among their own school's graduates, a relationship 
appears between debts and job choices. They can also use the 
approaches discussed here to learn whether large numbers of their 
graduates will be facing worrisome debt burdens in relation to 
their probable incomes. 
A second step is for law schools to strive to be as 
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informative as possible to their students about the burdens they 
are likely to face from their loan payments. Most schools, 
perhaps all, try to help students calculate what their debt 
payments will be in relation to their income. Students with 
substantial debts who have hoped to enter government or legal 
services or very small firms often worry throughout law school 
about comfortably making ends meet after they graduate. Our study 
suggests that their concern is justified, but that the concern 
should not be exaggerated. A challenge for law schools will be to 
provide these students candid information about their probable 
debt burdens and about ways to ameliorate those burdens that do 
not unduly discourage the students from holding onto their 
aspirations. 
A more delicate challenge is posed in providing advice to 
students with low grades, for these students may have arrived at 
law school with aspirations for high-paying jobs and have already 
borrowed, by the end of their first year, on the basis of their 
aspirations.75 At schools at which there is a strong relationship 
between grades and higher-earning job opportunities--a 
relationship we found at all of our lower-tuition, Group A 
schools and at many of our Group B schools--financial aid 
advisors need to warn students with low grades (perhaps at the 
beginning of their second year) about the probability that they 
will have even more burdensome debt payments than their 
classmates with higher grades in relation to their incomes. 
75 See discussion, supra, at pages 51-53. 
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Even more delicate is the task of providing counselling to. 
minority students. If a particular law school knows, from past 
experience, that its minority students have, in general, attained 
substantially lower law school grades than other students and 
that students with lower grades have difficulties in finding 
high-paying employment, it then has a fairly solid basis for 
predicting, from the outset of law school, that minority students 
who borrow heavily are likely to have especial financial 
difficulties in paying off their loans. No law school will feel 
comfortable in advising its entering minority students that they 
are likely to have narrower career choices than their majority 
classmates. To do so risks undermining the self-confidence of 
students already likely to feel uncertain. If schools are 
unwilling (for understandable reasons) to be candid with 
entering minority students about the risks of financial 
difficulties, then they need to work especially hard to provide 
scholarships or grants to minority students to reduce the amounts 
of debt with which they graduate. 
Some schools have responded to the problem of declining 
numbers of graduates entering public service or public interest 
work by creating programs that permit students to defer payments 
on their loans or that provide direct support from the law school 
for paying off the loans.76 These programs are often known as 
"loan forgiveness" programs. This study's finding of a 
76 See D. Vernon, Education Debt Burden: Law School 
Assistance Programs--A Review of Existing Programs and a 
Proposed New Approach, 39 J. of Legal Ed. 743 (1989). 
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relationship between job choices and debts may suggest that loan 
forgiveness programs are a useful way to reduce the impact of 
debts on job selection. 
We need, however, to be careful not to overstate the 
conclusions of this study. The evidence is not yet strong enough 
to be certain that reducing the dread of large loan payments will 
cause many students to decide to take a public service job. Even 
if further research demonstrates more conclusively that debts are 
detering some students from public service, it remains likely 
that a high proportion of the students who apply for a school's 
loan forgiveness program will be students who would have taken 
public service jobs even if the forgiveness program hadn't 
existed. Thus, if a law school decides to adopt a loan 
forgiveness program, it should do so only in small part in the 
hope of inducing many students to hold onto a plan of public 
service they would otherwise feel forced to abandon and in larger 
part on other defensible grounds for adopting such programs--for 
example, that they will deliver a valuable general message about 
the worthiness of public service work or that they will help 
relieve the burden of loan payments for those who take public 
service jobs. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A1+ 
Factors That Relate to Students' Expectations to Enter Jobs in 
Government, Legal Services or Public Interest Work or That Relate to 
Expectations to Enter Jobs in Mid-Sized or Large Firms 
Debt/$10000 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
Grade Quartile*** 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
# of Interviewing 
Employers/100 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
Salaries in Govt., 
v.small firm as % 
of Larger Firm 
(X100) 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
(All Nine Schools] 
All students: Debtors only: All students 
who expects who expects who expects 
lower- lower- higher-
paying job* paying job* paying job** 
(n=1097) (n=87) (n=1097) 
-.011 
1. 61 
.11 
+.09 
7.65 
.001 
-.031 
6.05 
.001 
+.005 
3.08 
.01 
-.028 
3.23 
.002 
+.10 
7.52 
.001 
-.032 
5. 36 
.001 
+.004 
2.36 
.02 
+.016 
2.30 
.03 
-.12 
9.63 
.001 
+.057 
10.2 
.001 
-.003 
1. 82 
.07 
Debtors only:
who expects 
lower-
paying job** 
n=877 
+.031 
3.50 
.001 
-.13 
9.49 
.001 
+.060 
9.82 
.001 
-.002 
1. 07 
.28 
Adjusted r2= 14.6% 16.2% 23.7% 27.0% 
* The lower-paying settings were government, legal services and firms with 
five or fewer lawyers. 
** The higher-paying settings were firms of 20 or more lawyers. 
*** Students in the first quartile have the highest grades. Thus, the 
higher the number of a student's quartile the lower the student's grades. 
+ See discussion at pages 20-32. 
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Appendix Table A2+ 
Factors That Relate to students' Expectations to Enter Jobs in 
Government, Legal Services or Public Interest Work or That Relate to 
Expectations to Enter Jobs in Mid-Sized or Large Firms 
1Group A Schools Only 
All students: Debtors only: 
Qebt/$10000 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
Grade Quartile*** 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
# of Interviewing 
Employers/100 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
Salaries in Govt., 
V.Small firm as % 
of Larger Firm 
(x100 l 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
who expects 
lower-
paying job* 
(n=251) 
+.019 
.84 
.40 
+.16 
5.41 
.001 
-.746 
3.45 
.001 
+.003 
1.06 
.29 
Adjusted r2= 14.3% 
who expects 
lower-
paying job* 
(n=195) 
-.022 
.71 
.49 
+.16 
4.76 
.001 
-.760 
3.16 
.002 
+.005 
1. 65 
.10 
14.4% 
All students 
who expects 
higher-
paying job** 
(n=251) 
+.010 
.568 
.58 
-.17 
7.59 
.001 
+.721 
4.19 
.001 
-.004 
1. 98 
.05 
Debtors only: 
who expects 
lower-
paying job** 
(n=l95) 
+.067 
2.78 
.01 
-.16 
6.34 
.001 
+.666 
3.59 
.001 
-.007 
2.79 
. 01 
23.8% 24.8% 
* The lower-paying settings were government, legal services and firms with 
five or fewer lawyers. 
** The higher-paying settings were firms of 20 or more lawyers. 
*** Students in the first quartile have the highest grades. Thus, the 
higher the number of a student's quartile the lower the student's grades. 
+ See discussion at pages 20-32. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A3+ 
Factors That Relate to Students' Expectations to Enter Jobs in 
Government, Legal Services or Public Interest Work or That Relate to 
Expectations to Enter Jobs in Mid-Sized or Large Firms 
Debt/$10000 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
Grade Quartile*** 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
# of Interviewing 
Employers/100 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
Salaries in Govt., 
V.Small firm as % 
of Larger Firm 
(XlOO) 
B 
T-ratio 
probability< 
Adjusted r2= 
Group B Schools 
Only 
All students: 
who expects 
lower-
paying job* 
(n=846) 
-.008 
1. 27 
.20 
+.07 
5.36 
.001 
-.020 
2.90 
.01 
+.001 
0.29 
.78 
5.0% 
Debtors only: 
who expects 
lower-
paying job* 
(n=682) 
-.017 
2.04 
.04 
+.08 
5.67 
.001 
-.015 
1. 96 
.05 
+.003 
.693 
.50 
5.9% 
All students 
who expects 
higher-
paying job** 
(n=846) 
+.012 
1. 59 
.10 
-.10 
6.93 
.001 
+.047 
5.88 
.001 
-.002 
.382 
.70 
Debtors only: 
who expects 
lower-
paying job** 
(n=682) 
+.021 
1.99 
.05 
-.12 
6.97 
.001 
+.048 
5.14 
.001 
-.006 
1. 34 
.18 
12.5% 15.4% 
* The lower-paying settings were government, legal services and firms with 
five or fewer lawyers. 
** The higher-paying settings were firms of 20 or more lawyers. 
*** Students in the first quartile have the highest grades. Thus, the 
higher the number of a student's quartile the lower the student's grades. 
+ See discussion at pages 20-32. 
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APPENDIX 
Questionnaire Distributed to Graduating Classes 
at 9 Schools, April 1989 
SURVEY OF GRADUATING CLASS 
1. Do you have a job arranged for next year? ____ Yes ____ No 
2. Whatever your answer to question 1, in what sort of setting will you 
be working (or think it is most likely that you will be working} next 
year? 
a. judicial clerkship. 
b. solo practice. 
c. :::: practicing law in a firm that has approximately 
other lawyers. (Fill in approximate number.) 
d. practicing law in a government agency or prosecutor's 
office. 
e. practicing law in a legal services, public defender or 
other nonprofit "public interest" organization. 
f. practicing law in a business or financial corporation. 
g. practicing law in some other setting ~~~--------~ 
h. not practicing law, working (or studying) in some other 
setting=-----------------------------------------------
3. If you have a judicial clerkship, what sort of setting do you expect 
to work in after completing the clerkship? (Use letter from question 2, 
above. If a private firm, indicate approximate expected 
size.) ____________________ __ 
4. If you know, what will be your approximate salary next year? ____________ _ 
5. Do you have a spouse/living partner? If yes, what would you 
estimate will be his/her approximate earnings next year? ____________ __ 
6. Approximately how much contractually enforceable debt do you now have, 
in total, from tuition and living expenses of college, law school and 
other graduate studies? ________________________ _ 
7. What is your approximate cumulative grade point average in law 
school? (~., 2.7, 3.2) 
8. What is your gender? ____ female 
9. What is your racejethnic group? 
Asian/Oriental 
Black/African-American 
HispanicjLatino 
[Please fold sheet. 
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male 
Native American 
===: White/Caucasian 
Other: 
Do not sign it.] 
